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Do Third-Party Guarantors Reassure Foot Soldiers?*

Natalia Garbiras-Díaz,[†] Michael Weintraub,[‡] Leopoldo Fergusson,[§]
Juana García,[¶] and Laia Balcells^{||}

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Abstract Since the end of the Cold War, international third parties such as the United Nations (UN) have become frequent guarantors of peace agreements. Existing studies document that third parties provide assurances that help maintain peace, yet these studies nearly exclusively marshal evidence at the macro-level and focus on elites rather than foot soldiers. Also, their focus is often on the immediate aftermath of war, rather than how third parties affect agreement implementation. Using a novel phone survey of 4,435 ex-combatants from the FARC-EP, Colombia’s largest rebel group, and an embedded survey experiment, we examine the role of third parties in providing guarantees to foot soldiers during the implementation of the Colombian peace agreement, five years after its signing. We find no evidence that the UN Verification Mission in Colombia increased: confidence among ex-combatants that the government would fulfill its commitment to implement the peace agreement, confidence that the FARC would do the same, perceptions of physical safety, positive perceptions of ex-combatants’ future economic prospects, nor trust in institutions more generally. We discuss possible explanations for these null findings and the study’s relevance to debates about conflict termination, peace agreement implementation, and international intervention.

Keywords: Conflict, Peace, Third parties, Commitment.

JEL Codes: D70, D74

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¿Los garantes internacionales dan confianza a los excombatientes rasos?*

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Desde el final de la Guerra Fría, terceros internacionales como la Organización de las Naciones Unidas (ONU) se han convertido en frecuentes garantes de los acuerdos de paz. Los estudios existentes documentan que estos garantes brindan garantías que ayudan a mantener la paz; sin embargo, estos estudios reúnen evidencia casi exclusivamente a nivel macro y se enfocan en las élites en lugar de en los combatientes rasos. Además, a menudo se centran en las consecuencias inmediatas de la guerra, en lugar de cómo los garantes afectan la implementación del acuerdo. Utilizando una encuesta telefónica novedosa de 4.435 excombatientes de las FARC-EP, el grupo rebelde más grande de Colombia, y un experimento de encuesta, examinamos el papel de los terceros en la provisión de garantías a los guerrilleros durante la implementación del acuerdo de paz colombiano, cinco años después de su firma. No encontramos evidencia de que la Misión de Verificación de la ONU en Colombia aumentara: la confianza entre los excombatientes de que el gobierno cumpliría su compromiso de implementar el acuerdo de paz, la confianza de que las FARC harían lo mismo, las percepciones de seguridad física, las percepciones positivas de los excombatientes las perspectivas económicas futuras de los combatientes, ni la confianza en las instituciones en general. Discutimos las posibles explicaciones de estos hallazgos nulos y la relevancia del estudio para los debates sobre la terminación de conflictos, la implementación de acuerdos de paz y la intervención internacional.

Palabras clave: Conflicto, Paz, Garantes internacionales, Compromiso.
Códigos JEL: D70, D74

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Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, international third-parties such as the United Nations (UN) have increased their involvement in countries emerging from conflict, leaving behind traditional peace-keeping strategies and broadening the scope of activities undertaken to stabilize fragile countries. Third-parties have been intimately involved in pushing more expansive post-conflict policies that encompass issues of peace, democracy and human rights, and are often responsible for overseeing, monitoring, and managing transitions to peace in post-conflict environments.¹ UN missions in East Timor, Mozambique, and elsewhere have revealed how third parties provide incentives for formerly warring parties to comply with agreed-upon commitments.²

The need for third-party involvement arises from credible commitment problems in the aftermath of civil war, when warring parties reach a mutual agreement yet some actors have incentives to violate it.³ The actor with the most power—often the government—can take advantage of power imbalances to undermine the peace agreement by creating new institutions that diminish the power granted or promised to opponents in the agreement;⁴ launching attacks on former rebels or political opponents;⁵ or using the government’s limited institutional capacity for other priorities rather than to carry out changes promised in the agreement.⁶

While these problems initially arise during the negotiation phase, related pathologies carry over into agreement implementation, when former rebels remain relatively weak and have not yet consolidated and legitimized political power.⁷ Furthermore, national political institutions are themselves often fragile, making it difficult to detect and punish noncompliance.⁸ Third party involvement increases the likelihood of a stable peace, at least in the short term,⁹ insofar as it not only monitors non-compliance but provides conditional incentives that tie the hands of the stronger party (governments) and reassure the weaker party (ex-combatants).¹⁰

The lion’s share of existing work focuses on how third-parties help formerly warring parties reach peace agreements, and decrease the probability of conflict recurrence in the first few years after the fighting stops. Yet international involvement also influences how peace agree-

¹Matanock 2020; Fortna 2008.

²Arnault 2006; Howard 2008; Walter 2009.

³Fearon 2004; Simmons and Danner 2010.

⁴Atlas and Licklider 1999; Girod 2015.

⁵Fearon 2004; Mattes and Savun 2009.

⁶Matanock 2020.

⁷Matanock 2017a,b.

⁸Matanock 2020.

⁹Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild 2001.

¹⁰Matanock 2020.

ments are implemented over the medium-term: international actors can directly provide benefits to ex-combatants that raise the costs of defection, and help smooth political transitions between incumbent governments that may involve dramatic shifts in willingness to faithfully implement a peace agreement. Moreover, most existing research on international assurances focuses on elite actors and their ability to ensure that foot soldiers do not rearm,¹¹ rather than on rank-and-file soldiers, who represent the vast majority of former fighters. Existing work also tends to operate at the macro-level, focusing on country-level outcomes such as conflict recurrence, as opposed to the individual decisions of former combatants. Finally, existing work tends to exclusively focus on defection and rearmament, ignoring the attitudes and beliefs that underpin ex-combatant decisions. These factors limit what we can learn about how the bulk of ex-combatants respond to international involvement in post-conflict settings.¹²

In this paper, we theorize about how third-parties contribute to peace beyond the negotiation phase, once implementation is well underway. We then provide microfoundational evidence about how third-parties may affect ex-combatant *foot soldiers* across a range of outcomes. More specifically, we conduct an original phone-based survey of 4,435 former combatants of the FARC-EP, Colombia's largest rebel group, which demobilized following a 2016 peace agreement signed with the government. Fielded between December 2021 and January 2022, we embed a survey experiment to study the role of the UN Verification Mission in Colombia. This Mission has the mandate to verify the implementation of political, economic, and social reincorporation, and to offer security guarantees to demobilized ex-combatants, human rights activists, and social and political leaders. Our pre-registered survey experiment randomly assigns some respondents to receive a prime with a true statement mentioning that the UN reiterated its commitment to the peace process and renewed the Mission's initial mandate (which ended in September 2021). Respondents were block randomized to the treatment condition based on their pre-treatment reported trust in the UN verification mission. We then assess whether those randomly exposed to this message, compared to those not exposed, are more likely to support the peace agreement, to be more optimistic about their reincorporation processes, to be more optimistic about the implementation of the agreement, to feel safer, to assess their future economic prospects more positively, and to have more trust in others and in national and local political institutions.

We find no evidence that the experiment moved ex-combatant foot soldiers' beliefs across

¹¹For example, Daly 2014 points to the role of mid-level commanders in preventing civil war recurrence.

¹²Some work explores citizen perceptions of international interventions, rather than those of ex-combatants: for example, Kelmendi and Radin 2018 finds limited satisfaction with the UN mission in Kosovo; Nomikos 2022 finds experimental evidence that UN peacekeepers in Mali help reduce in-group and out-group tensions; Allen et al. 2020 find that closer contact and obtaining benefits from the U.S. increases support for the latter's presence in the host country; and Blair 2020 studies how UN peacekeeping missions affect citizen perceptions about the rule of law.

any of these outcomes. These null findings suggest that the theoretical framework inherited from third-party credible commitments may struggle to explain foot soldier behavior during the implementation phase of peace agreements. These results also cut against our pre-registered hypotheses.

The discussion section studies several plausible explanations to help us understand these null results. We bring to bear additional qualitative evidence—from interviews with 20 core stakeholders intimately involved in both the negotiation and implementation of the Colombian 2016 peace agreement—to show that these individuals believed that the UN Mission mattered for implementation and effectively reassured ex-combatants, at least at the elite level.¹³ One possibility is that the reassuring role that the Mission had on elites may not have trickled down to foot soldiers. We ask whether the lack of boots on the ground in Colombia might, conversely, explain our null findings. However, the UN Verification Mission in Colombia is a case where we should expect reassurance among the ex-combatant population, given the Mission’s formal role in demobilization and reincorporation, physical protection of ex-combatants, and economic reincorporation. As such, we do not believe our null findings can be attributed to a weak mission. The discussion then turns back to our survey data, where we show that neither lack of trust nor infrequent exposure to the third-party can explain our results: the UN Verification Mission elicits high levels of trust among ex-combatants, and we find no evidence that treatment effects vary in a statistically significant way as a function of either trust or contact. We also use a manipulation check to show null effects on outcomes even among those ex-combatants who felt reassured by the UN Verification Mission’s commitment to the agreement’s implementation. Finally, we consider whether our null results can be attributed to limited statistical power. They cannot: we are well-powered to detect even small treatment effects. We suggest potential scope conditions for third-party assurance theories and chart a path to push forward the research agenda on peace agreement implementation and foot soldiers in post-conflict contexts.

Our study contributes to multiple bodies of research. First, and most directly, we contribute to the literature on post-conflict peacebuilding and statebuilding, providing a novel theoretical discussion about how international involvement differentially affects rank-and-file and elite ex-combatants during the implementation phase of a peace agreement. Second, we use a survey experiment to causally identify the effect of third parties on a range of ex-combatant attitudes and beliefs. Third, we reinvigorate a conversation about the proper role of foot soldiers in the literature on post-conflict transitions. Finally, we contribute to the literature on demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration, presenting findings from an original survey of FARC ex-combatants, among the largest surveys of ex-combatants ever implemented by scholars.

¹³Interview subjects include a former FARC high commander, representatives of the UN Verification Mission, international donors, and government officials responsible for demobilization and reincorporation, among others.

Theoretical framework

Existing quantitative and qualitative research on civil war termination has shown that third-party guarantors play a crucial role in both stopping the fighting¹⁴ and maintaining post-conflict peace.¹⁵ The vast majority of the literature on peace settlements, however, draws on evidence at the macro level, adopting as the unit of analysis the peace agreement or conflict dyad.¹⁶ In part due to inferential challenges, few studies examine the effect that third-party guarantors have on former foot soldiers' attitudes and commitments to signed peace agreements. Likewise, few scholars focus on the implementation phase of peace agreements, despite the fact that third parties should play an important role in ensuring effective agreement implementation.

During peace agreement implementation, the needs of ex-combatants shift, and new challenges emerge.¹⁷ While the initial phase of agreement implementation includes ensuring effective demobilization and disarmament, particularly guaranteeing physical protection for ex-combatants within territorially-delimited areas, medium-term security requirements include protecting ex-combatants who are no longer congregated in relatively few geographic clusters and neutralizing threats posed by splinter groups who may seek to either recruit ex-combatants into armed groups or punish them for remaining demobilized.¹⁸

The economic needs of ex-combatants also shift between the time an agreement is signed and a few years into its implementation.¹⁹ Short-term economic needs include ensuring that ex-combatants have the resources to meet their basic needs, including housing and food.²⁰ In order for these programs to be self-sustaining, however, ex-combatants in the medium-term need employment training or other skills-building assistance to ensure their effective labor market integration.²¹

In addition to meeting ex-combatants' economic needs, poor physical and mental health are core challenges in the immediate aftermath of conflict, given that some former fighters enter civilian life with serious health problems.²² An initial step is to diagnose properly and treat acute conditions, while a medium-term challenge is to address chronic health issues and ensure access to proper mental health services, all while integrating these individuals into the formal health system

¹⁴Fortna 2008; Howard 2019.

¹⁵Fortna 2008; Matanock and Lichtenheld 2022.

¹⁶Croicu et al. 2013; Karreth et al. 2023.

¹⁷Muggah 2009.

¹⁸Stedman 1997; Prem et al. 2021.

¹⁹Nilsson 2005.

²⁰Knight and Özerdem 2004.

²¹Subedi 2014; Blattman and Annan 2016; Lamb 2011.

²²Hecker et al. 2013.

and insurance markets.²³

Finally, as ex-combatants re-enter civilian life, they may face challenges in integrating into the communities in which they choose to live after their immediate demobilization. A longstanding literature on DDR has shown that frustration and feelings of rejection by host communities can increase ex-combatants' risk of rearming.²⁴ Instead, feelings of integration can result in a reduced need to (re)organize among themselves.²⁵ Successful social reincorporation not only reduces the risk of defection, but also increases the trust and sense of trustworthiness of the ex-combatants,²⁶ further facilitating their integration into the host communities. Relatedly, ex-combatants must (re-)establish their citizenship and overcome any outstanding legal issues against them in order to effectively reincorporate into civilian life.²⁷ Political reincorporation over the medium-term entails providing the conditions for the full exercise of ex-combatants' political rights, including voting, running for local or national office, or assuming leadership roles in civil society and local communities.²⁸

While existing literature tends to focus on the role of international third-parties during the agreement signing phase—helping to mitigate credible commitment problems that prevent warring parties from reaching an agreement—here we draw attention to how international third-parties assume multiple roles to address new challenges faced by foot soldiers, particularly during implementation. These new roles go beyond simply enforcing compliance with the terms of agreements through blue helmets or military observers.²⁹ First, these actors fund programs and ensure access to basic services for the demobilized population while coordinating disparate institutions involved in agreement implementation. Even if third parties cannot directly coerce governments to implement policies that guarantee the economic reincorporation of ex-combatants, they can help coordinate other international actors to finance such programs.³⁰ As a result, the engagement of third-party actors may yield better future economic prospects for rank-and-file ex-combatants.

Second, third-parties can increase former foot soldiers' willingness to remain committed to the agreement by providing them with security and legal guarantees. Most post-conflict international missions are mandated to produce detailed reports for donor countries or international organizations, which can condition aid or investment to maintain recipient governments' commitment to

²³Johnson et al. 2008.

²⁴Knight and Özerdem 2004; Özerdem 2012.

²⁵Kaplan and Nussio 2018.

²⁶Bauer, Fiala and Lively 2018.

²⁷Nilsson 2005.

²⁸Patel, De Greiff and Waldorf 2010.

²⁹Doyle and Sambanis 2011.

³⁰Ball and Hendrickson 2005; Karreth et al. 2023; Salmon 2020.

implementing peace.³¹ UN missions also submit these reports to high-level bodies, such as the UN Security Council. By observing the compliance of parties to the agreement, these missions can raise concerns about the security of former foot soldiers, including threats posed by spoilers like dissident groups. Third-parties therefore provide assurances to former rank-and-file soldiers that threats to their safety will be raised in high-level venues. These same actions also reassure ex-combatants that the legal benefits enshrined in peace agreements—such as reduced sentences in exchange for truth-telling—will not be revoked.

Third, if third parties work to reduce stigma towards ex-combatants and increase the latter's social acceptance, social trust may increase more broadly. The provision of development and community-based projects by third parties can also increase ex-combatants' trust towards their fellow citizens; ordinary citizens may be less likely to hold grudges against ex-combatants, since they may no longer perceive them as competitors for state resources. Third parties can thus improve ex-combatants' perceptions about social reincorporation and the extent to which society is likely to accept them.

Finally, international third-parties can facilitate foot soldiers' political reincorporation. Because third-parties are seen as impartial arbiters in elections, they can provide safeguards to electoral processes that encourage the political participation of ex-combatants, either as voters or candidates. Because international missions often include democracy promotion mandates, third-party engagement may help convince former foot soldiers that future elections will be free and fair.³² Rank-and-file ex-combatants, who are not typically the direct beneficiaries of electoral provisions included in peace agreements (e.g. guaranteed congressional seats),³³ can be assured that their political participation (whether voting or running for office) will be protected by third-party oversight.

Given these important roles, the core prediction is that international third-parties should have a positive effect on ex-combatants' perceptions of the likelihood that the government will implement a peace agreement, and will improve their perceptions regarding their reincorporation processes. Our first hypothesis is:

H1: The presence of third-parties will increase ex-combatants' commitment to the peace agreement, and improve their perceptions of their reincorporation processes.

³¹For instance, peacekeeping missions must submit a performance report to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) at the end of each financial cycle that demonstrates how money was spent. This report must then be formally approved by the UNGA.

³²Blair, Di Salvatore and Smidt 2022.

³³Matanock 2017b.

Third parties offer foot soldiers multiple assurances regarding their perceived security and continued support for successful economic, social, and political reincorporation. We derive the following sub-hypothesis from the above discussion:

H1a: Third-parties increase foot soldiers' perceptions of their security.

H1b: Third-parties increase foot soldiers' perceptions of their economic prospects.

H1c: Third-parties increase foot soldiers' perceptions of their social reincorporation.

H1d: Third-parties increase foot soldiers' perceptions of their political reincorporation.

We test other possible effects that are admittedly more speculative. First, the reassuring effects of international third-parties may be increasing in levels of pre-existing trust in the third-party, as well as the extent to which ex-combatants have interacted with that third-party. For example, there is evidence that receiving direct benefits or having contact with foreign organizations such as the US Army has positively influenced perceptions of the US military, the US government, and the US population more broadly.³⁴ A similar dynamic may be at work with third-party guarantors. (We acknowledge, however, potential ceiling effects that would prevent us from observing any heterogeneity.)

H2: Third parties' potential to increase ex-combatants' commitment to the agreement is (weakly) increasing on pre-existing levels of trust towards (and interactions with) those third parties.

We also hypothesize about potential *unintended* consequences that these actors may generate. Building on research about the effect of international state-building interventions on host states' capacity,³⁵ we argue that in weak institutional settings, international third-parties play roles that otherwise should be performed by national institutions. Absent a sufficiently strong and capable state to provide those services, international actors may be seen as the principal actor capable of ensuring the sustainability of reincorporation programs.³⁶ As such, we may see "crowding out" of national and local institutions.

H3a: Substitution effects ("crowding out") are likely to exist, increasing trust in international third-parties at the expense of trust in national and local institutions.

Alternatively, if these international institutions are seen as cooperating with and bolstering domestic institutions, we might expect instead a "transfer effect," whereby the trust premium enjoyed

³⁴Allen et al. 2020.

³⁵Blair 2021.

³⁶Blair 2019.

by third parties is transferred to local institutions cooperating with them.³⁷ Citizens with greater exposure to the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), for example, were more likely to rely on state (versus non-state) institutions to solve criminal cases.³⁸

H3b: Trust in international third-parties is likely to increase trust in national and local institutions (“crowding in”).

Context

The Colombian conflict has involved an array of left- and right-wing armed groups, including paramilitaries nominally aligned with the state (e.g., *Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia*, AUC), small insurgent groups representing marginalized populations (e.g., Movimiento Armado Quintín Lame), and large rebel armies fighting for land redistribution and a new economic model for the country (e.g., FARC). The ongoing conflict has its roots in *La Violencia*, a conflict that lasted from 1948 until 1958, which ended with a rotating presidency between the two traditional Liberal and Conservative parties to stem the violence. Two left-wing insurgent groups—the FARC and the National Liberation Army (ELN)—emerged at the end of *La Violencia*. The ELN remains active to this day.

During Andrés Pastrana administration (1998-2002), a peace process with the FARC involved the creation of the *zona de distensión* (ZD), equivalent to nearly 40,000 square kilometers, which was demilitarized and ceded to the FARC. This process failed in 2002, shortly before President Álvaro Uribe took office and initiated a military offensive against FARC. The Uribe government successfully killed multiple members of the FARC’s Secretariat and induced many others to demobilize individually, dealing a significant blow to insurgents’ abilities while massively increasing human rights violations.

With severely weakened operational capabilities, the FARC entered into secret, exploratory meetings with the Juan Manuel Santos administration in 2011 to discuss a peace process. The process was launched publicly in mid-2012, with negotiations held in Havana, Cuba. In 2016, a final agreement was signed and initially put to a popular referendum, which was narrowly rejected. To salvage the agreement, the negotiating parties made adjustments to the accords and then fast-tracked the agreement through Congress, without again subjecting it to popular approval.

³⁷Matanock 2018.

³⁸In a cross-national comparison, Blair 2020 shows that the presence of UN personnel improves the rule of law (see also Blair 2021).

In addition to addressing some root causes of the conflict, including rural reform, illicit drugs and the political participation of the FARC, the effective reincorporation of former members was a central objective of the agreement. Threats to the physical security of ex-combatants have been severe: according to the UN, more than 300 have been assassinated since the peace agreement was signed. Beyond physical violence, surveys consistently show that stigma against FARC ex-combatants is pervasive,³⁹ and represents a significant barrier to their successful insertion into social, economic, and political life.

The peace agreement assigned an important role to two separate UN missions. The first of these missions—the United Nations Mission in Colombia—was active from September 2016 to September 2017 and focused on verifying the bilateral ceasefire and the disarmament of the FARC-EP, as well as facilitating and coordinating activities between the two parties.⁴⁰ The second one—the UN Verification Mission in Colombia—began in September 2017 and is still ongoing. It focuses on verifying the political, economic, and social reintegration of former combatants, as well as ensuring personal and collective security guarantees for them and the communities where they are settled.

More specifically, the core functions of the second UN Mission can be broadly divided into security and economic tasks. In terms of security actions, the Mission is charged with coordinating with the National Police and the National Protection Unit to protect FARC political party members;⁴¹ reporting on killings and disappearances of former FARC members and their relatives;⁴² and, along with the Special Investigation Unit and FARC, following up on potential threats and investigations against participants undergoing reincorporation.⁴³ Economic tasks include verifying compliance with a road map to facilitate economic and social reincorporation actions;⁴⁴ verifying and helping the FARC and the government to coordinate the provision of basic goods to former combatants in territorial areas for training and reincorporation;⁴⁵ and reporting on the most critical issues within the overall peace consolidation agenda.⁴⁶ In other words, the second UN Verification Mission has monitoring and reporting responsibilities, while also coordinating the delivery of services—including those related to the physical integrity of ex-combatants—as established in the peace agreement.

³⁹Weintraub et al. 2023.

⁴⁰See sections 3.2 and 3.4 of the Final Agreement.

⁴¹UN 2018a.

⁴²Ibid.

⁴³UN 2020.

⁴⁴UN 2017a.

⁴⁵UN 2017b, 2018b.

⁴⁶UN 2017b.

In addition to these functions, the UN Verification Mission in Colombia has been coordinating the efforts of the international community to provide additional funds to ensure the ex-combatants' livelihoods and thus the successful economic reincorporation of foot soldiers. For example, it has provided bridging support to 34 ex-combatant-led income-generating projects, funded by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).⁴⁷ The UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPTF), through its "Colombia Peacekeeping Trust Fund," has also invested more than \$179 million in peacebuilding efforts in the country. Qualitative interviews—which we discuss in detail in the Discussion section below—corroborate that former high-ranking commanders perceive this as a key role played by international third parties in Colombia. To what extent did these activities reassure ex-combatants? We now describe our empirical strategy, which attempts to answer this question.

Research Design

Survey Data Collection And Sample

In December 2021 and January 2022, we conducted a phone survey with ex-combatants from the FARC-EP, part of a multi-year collaboration between the authors, the *Agencia para la Reincorporación y la Normalización* (ARN)—the government agency responsible for reincorporation of FARC ex-combatants—and the CNR-FARC (now CNR-Comunes), the joint government/FARC mechanism for reincorporation and related topics as established by the peace agreement. We hired a survey firm, Sistemas Especializados de Información (SEI), to carry out the survey, which we conducted by phone to comply with public health measures related to COVID-19.

Our universe of respondents consisted of 11,374 FARC ex-combatants who, as of November 2021, were engaged in reincorporation processes in Colombia and had contact information available in the ARN's database.⁴⁸ We contacted the entire universe and established effective contact with 4,435 former FARC-EP combatants. For those we were initially unable to reach, enumerators called multiple times and at different times of the day, thereby increasing the probability of a successful survey.⁴⁹ The entire universe of respondents was called during the first 2 weeks—5,612 during the first week, and 5,722 in the second week—while the following 2 weeks were used to recontact those who had not yet answered the survey. Completed surveys lasted, on average, 25



⁴⁷UN 2019.

⁴⁸From a total of 12,028 individuals active in reincorporation processes.

⁴⁹In total, SEI made 275,731 phone calls. On average, 24 calls were made per potential respondent, and in some cases we made as many as 101 attempts to achieve contact and minimize different response rates by levels of cellphone coverage, respondent availability, or other characteristics.

minutes. All respondents were 18 years of age or older. Prior to administering each survey, the enumerator obtained informed consent. More details about the survey procedures and ethics can be found in Appendix A.1.

Crucially, as Figure 1 shows, our sample closely resembles the full universe across a variety of socio-economic variables, including age, sex, and residence within former ETCRs (see Appendix A.2 for a detailed description of the socio-demographic characteristics of ex-combatants).






FIGURE 1: *Survey Sample Versus Full Universe*

To the best of our knowledge, our sample is one of the largest among existing surveys of ex-combatants, and the first of this magnitude conducted with FARC ex-combatants. In Colombia, the *Fundación Ideas para la Paz* (FIP) interviewed 1,485 demobilized members of various illegal armed groups.⁵⁰ Arjona and Kalyvas⁵¹ completed 829 interviews with guerrilla deserters (FARC and ELN) and demobilized paramilitaries in the summer of 2005, while Daly⁵² uses a representative ex-combatant survey of 10,951 former paramilitaries across Colombia. In other countries, Humphreys and Weinstein⁵³ surveyed a total of 1,043 ex-combatants were completed in Sierra Leone; Hwang⁵⁴ interviewed 50 Indonesian jihadists; Hill, Taylor and Temin⁵⁵ based their research on a survey administered to more than 1,400 ex-combatants in Liberia. In other words, our remote survey of FARC ex-combatants is among the largest ever conducted, both in Colombia and beyond.

⁵⁰These data have been used by Kreutz and Nussio 2019; Oppenheim and Söderström 2018; Oppenheim and Weintraub 2017; Kaplan and Nussio 2018; Nussio 2011; Ugarriza and Nussio 2016, among others.

⁵¹Arjona and Kalyvas 2006.

⁵²Daly 2018.

⁵³Humphreys and Weinstein 2007.

⁵⁴Hwang 2018.

⁵⁵Hill, Taylor and Temin 2008.

Experimental Design

We investigate the extent to which the presence of international assurances affect attitudes among former rank-and-file combatants. We would ideally randomly assign the presence of a third-party and analyze individual attitudes, but this is neither ethical nor feasible. Instead, we leverage the fact that the mandate of the UN Verification Mission in the country was set to expire in September 2021, and randomly assign respondents to two different groups: a pure control group (50%) and a treatment group (50%). The treatment involves priming respondents by reading a true statement that explains that the UN had reiterated its commitment to its role in peace agreement implementation and renewed its Verification Mission's mandate, which was scheduled to end in September of 2021.

Note that our treatment condition performs one of two functions: it either informs ex-combatants about the extension and continued commitment of the UN (among those who did not know about the extension) or primes those who already knew about this to think about the Mission and its continued commitment to peace in Colombia. Therefore, we induce random variation in the extent to which former combatants are aware about the UN Verification Mission's role and commitment.

We block randomize based on trust in the UN Verification Mission, measured pre-treatment. The stratifying question asked “[h]ow much do you trust the UN Verification Mission?” which allowed us to classify respondents answering “somewhat” or “very much” as those who trust the third party, and those answering “not at all” or “very little” as not trusting the third party. A third group consists of respondents who answer that they do not know or do not wish to answer.

Within these three groups (trust/does not trust/doesn't know or won't answer), we randomize subjects into our two aforementioned experimental conditions: pure control and treatment. The prime for those in the treatment group is as follows: “The mandate of the Peace Agreement Verification Mission has been extended and the United Nations has expressed its commitment to the reincorporation process. Did you know this?” Respondents were then given the opportunity to respond yes or no. We also include a manipulation check at the end of the survey, asking all respondents whether they know that the UN Verification Mission's mandate has been extended. The wording is as follows: “Do you know if the mandate of the UN Verification Mission has been extended?” and respondents were then able to answer “Yes, it has been extended,” or “No, it has not been extended.”

We are interested in multiple sets of outcomes. First, we measure how ex-combatants perceive the future of the implementation of the peace agreement, and more specifically how confident they

are that the parties—the government and FARC—will follow-through with their commitments. The wording of these questions is as follows: “[h]ow confident are you that the national government will comply with the Peace Agreement?” to which respondents answered using a scale from 1 to 4 (where 1 means “not at all,” and 4 means “completely”). We ask a parallel question about their perceptions regarding FARC’s commitment to the agreement: “[h]ow confident are you that the signatories of the FARC-EP will comply with the Peace Agreement?” to which respondents answered using a scale from 1 to 4 (where 1 means “not at all,” and 4 means “completely”).⁵⁶

Second, we seek to understand whether third parties reassure ex-combatants about their physical safety. We include a question to assess perceived security risks during the reincorporation process: “[d]o you or your household consider that there is a risk to being in the reincorporation process?” to which respondents answered “yes” or “no.”

Third, given the important role that the UN Verification Mission has in supporting economic opportunities for ex-combatants, we include a question that measures ex-combatants’ expectations about their prospective financial situation. We ask the following: “[w]hen you think about the future, how do you think your financial situation and that of your household will be in the next 12 months?” to which respondents answered “better off,” “the same,” or “worse off.”

Fourth, we also include questions to test whether third parties reassure ex-combatants about their social reintegration. We ask ex-combatants’ perceptions of the extent to which different measures will contribute to reconciliation: “How much do you think it would help to achieve reconciliation”: (a) that the truth about what happened in the context of the armed conflict is established; and (b) that those responsible for crimes ask for forgiveness from the victims. We coded answers for both questions using a 5-point Likert scale ranging from “not at all” to “very much.”

We also asked questions to capture other dynamics that may shape the integration of civil society and ex-combatants: i) ex-combatants’ perceptions of the willingness of either their communities or Colombians in general to reconcile (“In the community where you currently reside / in Colombia in general, how willing is the population to reconcile within the framework of the Peace Accords?”), coded using a 5-point Likert scale ranging from “not at all” to “very much;” ii) interpersonal trust, an index combining ex-combatants’ reported level of trust in their family, friends, neighbors, other former FARC combatants, and strangers, a 4-point Likert scale ranging from “not at all” to “very much”; and iii) how comfortable ex-combatants feel about revealing their belligerent past (“Thinking about the last year, in your daily life, how careful are you about

⁵⁶Our instrument allows respondents to skip any particular question or to respond that they do not know or do not wish to respond, but we do not repeat those options when discussing our core outcomes, for compactness.

telling others that you were a member of the FARC-EP?”), a 4-point Likert scale ranging from “not careful at all”, to “very careful.”

Fifth, to measure potential substitution effects between trust in third parties and government institutions (“crowding out”), or a potential transfer effect of trust from the UN to national institutions (“crowding in”), we create a battery of questions that measure trust in different institutions at the local and national levels, using a scale from 1 to 4 (where 1 means “not at all” and 4 means “very much”). More specifically, we asked the respondents how much they trust: i) the ARN, ii) the mayor’s office of their municipality, iii) the National Government, iv) the National Congress, v) the Colombian Armed Forces and vi) the National Police. We create and test effects on an institutional trust index.⁵⁷

Finally, the effect of third parties on respondent perceptions may vary depending upon pre-treatment levels of trust in these actors, and how frequently respondents are exposed to them. We interact the same pre-treatment question used for the block randomization—how much respondents trust the UN Verification Mission—with the treatment variable. Based on Allen et al.,⁵⁸ we include a question about frequency of direct contact with members of the UN Verification Mission. In particular, we ask the following: “[i]n the last 12 months, how often have you, a member of your family, or a close friend had direct contact with a member of the UN Verification Mission in Colombia?” and use a scale from 1 to 5 (where 1 is “never” and 5 is “always”). For the analyses, we coarsen this variable into three categories: no contact (if the ex-combatant answers 1 or 2), some contact (if answers 3), a lot of contact (if answers 4 or 5). We expect heterogeneity in treatment effects based on the frequency and type of exposure of ex-combatants to the UN Verification Mission.

Estimation

Our main estimand of interest is the Average Treatment Effect (ATE). We are interested in the average difference in survey responses to our outcomes of interest between treatment and control groups; that is, between those exposed to a randomized prompt about third party guarantors and those not receiving the prompt. We fit the following regression model:

$$y_i = \beta_0 + D_i + \alpha_b + \gamma_s + \epsilon_i \quad (1)$$

⁵⁷Appendix H explains the construction of these indices. For both the interpersonal and institutional trust indices, we also test for effects on their components. Our treatment has no significant effect on any of the institutions or groups of people included in these indices. Results are not shown.

⁵⁸Allen et al. 2020.

where y_i denotes subject i 's answer to the question measuring the outcome of interest, D_i denotes a treatment indicator, and α_b and γ_s correspond to block and strata fixed effects accounting for our randomization and sampling strategies, respectively. When testing for heterogeneous treatment effects, we interact the moderator of interest with the treatment indicator in model (1).

We also report two additional estimates in the main tables. First, we include interactions between the treatment and the block fixed effects that measure the level of trust ex-combatants have in the UN Verification mission. Second, we interact the treatment with our survey measure of the level of contact ex-combatants have with the UN Verification Mission. In Appendix F, we report additional results adjusting for covariates chosen via a double-post-lasso model selector.⁵⁹ All outcomes are standardized using the control group's mean and standard deviation.

Results

Appendix Section B presents summary statistics for all variables included in the analyses.⁶⁰ It also includes matrices of correlations between our main outcomes of interest and measures of ex-combatants' level of trust in the UN Verification Mission (Table A.3) and level of contact with the UN Verification Mission (Table A.4). The correlations provide preliminary descriptive evidence that ex-combatants who are more trusting of the Mission are also more positive about their reincorporation prospects, across all dimensions. However, the evidence for our contact measure is less robust, as it yields some negative but weak correlations. To examine the causal effect of this third party on ex-combatants' assessments of their reincorporation prospects, we then turn to the analysis of our experimental design.

Perceived Commitment Of The Parties To Implement The Agreement

Tables 1 and 2 present results for the main outcomes of interest for H1: the extent to which ex-combatants are confident that the government and FARC, respectively, will implement the 2016 peace agreement. For ease of interpretation, we present results here for a standardized version of the original variables, but present results using the scale in the Appendix G.⁶¹ In column 1 we present estimates of the pure effect, while columns 2 and 3 examine heterogeneous treatment effects by level of trust and contact with the UN verification mission, respectively (testing H2).

⁵⁹As discussed in Ahrens, Hansen and Schaffer 2020.

⁶⁰Appendix Section I shows missingness at random for all of our main outcomes of interest.

⁶¹The results discussed in this section do not change qualitatively when scaled outcomes are used.

Table 1 assesses whether our treatment affects ex-combatants' confidence in the national government's commitment to peace agreement implementation. We find that it does not. The coefficient on the treatment indicator, which corresponds to the pure vignette effect is very small (0.006), and we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no effect. Results from column 1 also show that, relative to ex-combatants who distrust the mission, those with a positive or no opinion of the mission (i.e., who answer "do not know" or who refuse to answer) are no more likely on average to feel confident in the government's commitment to implementing the agreement.

Next, we examine heterogeneous treatment effects by levels of pre-existing trust in the UN Verification Mission. Our null effects persist even among ex-combatants who trust the mission very much, or among those who do not have a strong opinion about it (column 2). We observe a small negative effect of the survey experiment treatment among the group of ex-combatants who choose not to answer or say they do not know whether they trust the Mission (column 3).

TABLE 1: Confidence in the Government to Implement the Peace Agreement

VARIABLES	Follow-through: Govt		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Committed UN	0.006 (0.030)	0.094 (0.058)	0.033 (0.045)
Trusts UN = Doesn't know/reply	0.429*** (0.132)	0.452** (0.195)	0.413*** (0.130)
Trusts UN = Yes	0.372*** (0.034)	0.427*** (0.047)	0.390*** (0.035)
Contact UN = Doesn't know/reply			0.479* (0.248)
Contact UN = Some Contact			-0.014 (0.050)
Contact UN = A lot of contact			-0.105** (0.053)
Committed UN × Trusts UN = Doesn't know/reply		-0.048 (0.265)	
Committed UN × Trusts UN = Yes		-0.112* (0.067)	
Committed UN × Contact UN = Doesn't know/reply			-0.588* (0.316)
Committed UN × Contact UN = Some Contact			-0.061 (0.069)
Committed UN × Contact UN = A lot of contact			-0.007 (0.075)
Constant	-0.075 (0.120)	-0.119 (0.122)	-0.061 (0.124)
Observations	4,388	4,388	4,388
Control mean	2.51	2.51	2.51
Control SD	1.09	1.09	1.09

Note: Section “Experimental Design” provides details on the coding of the dependent variable, which we transformed into z-scores, as described in Appendix Section H. Committed UN is a treatment indicator that takes the value of 1 for respondents assigned to the experimental prime. Blocks correspond to respondents’ trust in the UN: Doesn’t trust (baseline), Trusts, and doesn’t answer question or doesn’t know. In column 2, we estimate heterogeneous treatment effects by blocks measuring pre-treatment trust in the UN Verification Mission. In column 3 we include fixed effects for frequency of contact with the UN, and estimate heterogeneous treatment effects of this contact. This variable is taken from the question: “In the last 12 months, how often have you, a member of your family or a close friend had direct contact with a member of the UN Verification Mission in Colombia?” Those who answered “always” or “almost always” were coded as having “high contact”; those who answered “sometimes” were coded as having “some contact”; those who answered “almost never” or “never” were coded as having “low contact”; and those who didn’t know or didn’t answer were coded as “don’t know or don’t answer.” The base category is “little contact.” All columns include fixed effects for strata used for the sampling procedure. Robust standard errors appear in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Results from Table 2 likewise fail to support H1. Results from column 1 show that reinforcing

the UN's commitment has a negligible and insignificant effect on ex-combatants' confidence that the FARC will fulfill the commitments enshrined in the peace agreement. Point estimates are close to zero across specifications, and we find no statistically significant effects among the different subgroups.

TABLE 2: *Confidence in the FARC-EP to Implement the Peace Agreement*

VARIABLES	Follow-through: FARC		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Committed UN	0.039 (0.029)	0.087 (0.076)	0.072 (0.047)
Trusts UN = Doesn't know/reply	0.097 (0.131)	0.038 (0.181)	0.087 (0.133)
Trusts UN = Yes	0.392*** (0.041)	0.423*** (0.059)	0.350*** (0.042)
Contact UN = Doesn't know/reply			0.112 (0.213)
Contact UN = Some Contact			0.137*** (0.051)
Contact UN = A lot of contact			0.243*** (0.051)
Committed UN × Trusts UN = Doesn't know/reply		0.114 (0.261)	
Committed UN × Trusts UN = Yes		-0.063 (0.082)	
Committed UN × Contact UN = Doesn't know/reply			-0.406 (0.338)
Committed UN × Contact UN = Some Contact			-0.068 (0.071)
Committed UN × Contact UN = A lot of contact			-0.058 (0.070)
Constant	-0.475*** (0.110)	-0.498*** (0.116)	-0.562*** (0.112)
Observations	4,337	4,337	4,337
Control mean	3.90	3.90	3.90
Control SD	1.11	1.11	1.11

Note: See notes to Table 1. Robust standard errors appear in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

The results thus far suggest that reassurance about a third party's presence does not shape

former foot soldiers' attitudes. Furthermore, we find no effect of the treatment among subgroups that should be most susceptible to this information: those with high levels of trust or exposure to the third-party. While the results for FARC's commitment risk ceiling effects—given that 85% of respondents in the control group are already confident that the FARC will follow through—this is not the case for the government outcome: in the control group, only 40% of respondents are confident that the government will implement the agreement, leaving more room for movement induced by the treatment.

Security, Economic, And Social Reassurances

Next we examine whether the UN Verification Mission shapes ex-combatants' perspectives about security, economic, and social reincorporation, or what Dayal⁶² refers to as distributive benefits that go beyond security guarantees or compliance with the terms of an agreement but may motivate ex-combatants to remain within a peace agreement. These tables provide tests for H1a, H1b, and H1c.

In Table 3, we examine effects on ex-combatants' perceptions of security risks. We find that our treatment does not alter former foot soldiers' attitudes across the three specifications. Results are likewise null when examining the self-reported economic prospects of ex-combatants in Table 4. While the observational measure of trust in the UN Verification Mission seems to make ex-combatants more optimistic about their security and economic prospects, we are unable to recover consistent evidence that the treatment induces ex-combatants to report more positive perceptions for these two outcomes.

⁶²Dayal 2021.

TABLE 3: Safety Risks Given Reincorporation Process

VARIABLES	Safety risks		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Committed UN	0.010 (0.014)	0.002 (0.030)	0.014 (0.022)
Trusts UN = Doesn't know/reply	-0.171*** (0.061)	-0.137 (0.086)	-0.167*** (0.061)
Trusts UN = Yes	-0.047*** (0.017)	-0.053** (0.024)	-0.057*** (0.018)
Contact UN = Doesn't know/reply			-0.108 (0.102)
Contact UN = Some Contact			0.044* (0.024)
Contact UN = A lot of contact			0.055** (0.025)
Committed UN × Trusts UN = Doesn't know/reply		-0.067 (0.122)	
Committed UN × Trusts UN = Yes		0.012 (0.034)	
Committed UN × Contact UN = Doesn't know/reply			0.146 (0.145)
Committed UN × Contact UN = Some Contact			-0.007 (0.034)
Committed UN × Contact UN = A lot of contact			-0.017 (0.035)
Constant	0.714*** (0.052)	0.718*** (0.054)	0.693*** (0.053)
Observations	4,364	4,364	4,364
Control mean	0.67	0.67	0.67
Control SD	0.47	0.47	0.47

Note: See notes to Table 1. Robust standard errors appear in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

TABLE 4: Prospective Economic Situation

VARIABLES	Economic perspectives		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Committed UN	-0.009 (0.030)	-0.017 (0.077)	0.043 (0.048)
Trusts UN = Doesn't know/reply	0.169 (0.139)	0.136 (0.196)	0.172 (0.142)
Trusts UN = Yes	0.244*** (0.042)	0.239*** (0.060)	0.240*** (0.043)
Contact UN = Doesn't know/reply			0.029 (0.209)
Contact UN = Some Contact			0.073 (0.052)
Contact UN = A lot of contact			0.046 (0.054)
Committed UN × Trusts UN = Doesn't know/reply		0.064 (0.283)	
Committed UN × Trusts UN = Yes		0.009 (0.084)	
Committed UN × Contact UN = Doesn't know/reply			-0.176 (0.341)
Committed UN × Contact UN = Some Contact			-0.131* (0.073)
Committed UN × Contact UN = A lot of contact			-0.053 (0.074)
Constant	-0.068 (0.099)	-0.063 (0.106)	-0.101 (0.102)
Observations	4,332	4,332	4,332
Control mean	1.72	1.72	1.72
Control SD	0.56	0.56	0.56

Note: See notes to Table 1. Robust standard errors appear in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Tables 5-9 test the extent to which third-parties reassure ex-combatants' about their prospects for social reincorporation, captured in H1c. We ask about actions that have the potential to promote forgiveness and reconciliation (Table 5); perceived willingness of the population within an ex-combatant's municipality to reconcile (Table 6); perceived willingness of the population throughout Colombia to reconcile (Table 7); ex-combatants' willingness to tell others that they were for-

merly members of the FARC-EP (Table 8); and reported levels of interpersonal trust (Table 9).

The results indicate null effects for nearly all outcomes. While we find little evidence of heterogeneous treatment effects by levels of trust in the UN Verification Mission or contact with it, we comment here on a few specific results. Surprisingly, in Table 7 we find that among those reporting some contact with the UN (relative to those reporting no contact), the treatment appears to reduce ex-combatants' perceptions about Colombians' willingness to reconcile, although we caution against over-interpreting these results. In Table 8 (column 3), and as expected, we see that reminding ex-combatants about the UN Mission's mandate reduces their cautiousness in reporting that they once belonged to the FARC-EP. The pure treatment effect of -0.088 is only statistically significant at conventional levels for those who have no contact with the third-party. Results in Table 9, as above, show that the treatment increases interpersonal trust for those with no contact with the UN (the pure treatment effect) by 0.079 , a small but statistically significant effect at conventional levels. One possible interpretation is that those with no contact with the UN are best positioned to learn the most from our experimental treatment, although this interpretation is admittedly speculative.

TABLE 5: Truth and forgiveness

VARIABLES	Reconciliation via: truth			Reconciliation via: forgiveness		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Committed UN	0.003 (0.030)	-0.041 (0.074)	-0.019 (0.048)	0.009 (0.029)	-0.017 (0.076)	-0.017 (0.047)
Trusts UN = Doesn't know/reply	0.209 (0.144)	0.214 (0.228)	0.198 (0.142)	0.152 (0.138)	0.164 (0.221)	0.151 (0.135)
Trusts UN = Yes	0.416*** (0.041)	0.388*** (0.056)	0.374*** (0.041)	0.375*** (0.042)	0.358*** (0.059)	0.333*** (0.042)
Contact UN = Doesn't know/reply			0.016 (0.227)			-0.163 (0.269)
Contact UN = Some Contact			0.077 (0.051)			0.105** (0.051)
Contact UN = A lot of contact			0.219*** (0.052)			0.182*** (0.052)
Committed UN × Trusts UN = Doesn't know/reply		-0.008 (0.288)			-0.022 (0.276)	
Committed UN × Trusts UN = Yes		0.057 (0.081)			0.034 (0.082)	
Committed UN × Contact UN = Doesn't know/reply			0.206 (0.329)			0.076 (0.362)
Committed UN × Contact UN = Some Contact			0.054 (0.071)			-0.002 (0.071)
Committed UN × Contact UN = A lot of contact			-0.001 (0.073)			0.075 (0.070)
Constant	-0.519*** (0.120)	-0.497*** (0.125)	-0.582*** (0.123)	-0.248** (0.103)	-0.235** (0.109)	-0.303*** (0.106)
Observations	4,393	4,393	4,393	4,386	4,386	4,386
Control mean	3.94	3.94	3.94	4.04	4.04	4.04
Control SD	1.11	1.11	1.11	1.13	1.13	1.13

Note: See notes to Table 1. Robust standard errors appear in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

TABLE 6: *How willing is the population in your municipality to reconcile?*

VARIABLES	How willing is the population in your municipality to reconcile		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Committed UN	0.039 (0.030)	-0.050 (0.069)	0.058 (0.047)
Trusts UN = Doesn't know/reply	0.497*** (0.140)	0.400* (0.213)	0.492*** (0.139)
Trusts UN = Yes	0.404*** (0.039)	0.350*** (0.054)	0.343*** (0.039)
Contact UN = Doesn't know/reply			0.064 (0.250)
Contact UN = Some Contact			0.171*** (0.050)
Contact UN = A lot of contact			0.349*** (0.052)
Committed UN × Trusts UN = Doesn't know/reply		0.194 (0.281)	
Committed UN × Trusts UN = Yes		0.110 (0.076)	
Committed UN × Contact UN = Doesn't know/reply			-0.236 (0.323)
Committed UN × Contact UN = Some Contact			-0.022 (0.070)
Committed UN × Contact UN = A lot of contact			-0.071 (0.071)
Constant	-0.179 (0.109)	-0.134 (0.114)	-0.292*** (0.111)
Observations	4,324	4,324	4,324
Control mean	3.06	3.06	3.06
Control SD	0.88	0.88	0.88

Note: See notes to Table 1. Robust standard errors appear in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

TABLE 7: How willing is the population in Colombia in general to reconcile?

VARIABLES	How willing is the population in Colombia in general to reconcile		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Committed UN	0.045 (0.030)	-0.042 (0.072)	0.092** (0.046)
Trusts UN = Doesn't know/reply	0.565*** (0.140)	0.315 (0.207)	0.532*** (0.138)
Trusts UN = Yes	0.398*** (0.040)	0.348*** (0.056)	0.354*** (0.041)
Contact UN = Doesn't know/reply			0.365* (0.188)
Contact UN = Some Contact			0.127** (0.051)
Contact UN = A lot of contact			0.257*** (0.055)
Committed UN × Trusts UN = Doesn't know/reply		0.506* (0.276)	
Committed UN × Trusts UN = Yes		0.102 (0.079)	
Committed UN × Contact UN = Doesn't know/reply			-0.051 (0.324)
Committed UN × Contact UN = Some Contact			-0.123* (0.070)
Committed UN × Contact UN = A lot of contact			-0.058 (0.075)
Constant	-0.349*** (0.117)	-0.305** (0.120)	-0.443*** (0.119)
Observations	4,357	4,357	4,357
Control mean	3.04	3.04	3.04
Control SD	0.75	0.75	0.75

Note: See notes to Table 1. Robust standard errors appear in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

TABLE 8: Willingness to self-report having belonged to the FARC-EP

VARIABLES	Cautious in reporting FARC membership		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Committed UN	-0.032 (0.030)	-0.108 (0.072)	-0.088* (0.049)
Trusts UN = Doesn't know/reply	0.218* (0.119)	0.051 (0.170)	0.206* (0.119)
Trusts UN = Yes	0.089** (0.040)	0.044 (0.055)	0.067* (0.041)
Contact UN = Doesn't know/reply			0.088 (0.204)
Contact UN = Some Contact			0.029 (0.053)
Contact UN = A lot of contact			0.048 (0.054)
Committed UN × Trusts UN = Doesn't know/reply		0.338 (0.236)	
Committed UN × Trusts UN = Yes		0.090 (0.079)	
Committed UN × Contact UN = Doesn't know/reply			0.116 (0.298)
Committed UN × Contact UN = Some Contact			0.081 (0.074)
Committed UN × Contact UN = A lot of contact			0.109 (0.074)
Constant	0.028 (0.104)	0.066 (0.107)	0.016 (0.107)
Observations	4,396	4,396	4,396
Control mean	3.33	3.33	3.33
Control SD	1.05	1.05	1.05

Note: See notes to Table 1. Robust standard errors appear in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

TABLE 9: Interpersonal Trust

VARIABLES	Interpersonal trust		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Committed UN	0.034 (0.029)	0.016 (0.064)	0.079* (0.044)
Trusts UN = Doesn't know/reply	-0.003 (0.144)	-0.109 (0.198)	-0.027 (0.140)
Trusts UN = Yes	0.456*** (0.036)	0.447*** (0.051)	0.387*** (0.037)
Contact UN = Doesn't know/reply			0.363* (0.204)
Contact UN = Some Contact			0.287*** (0.048)
Contact UN = A lot of contact			0.377*** (0.051)
Committed UN × Trusts UN = Doesn't know/reply		0.209 (0.289)	
Committed UN × Trusts UN = Yes		0.018 (0.072)	
Committed UN × Contact UN = Doesn't know/reply			-0.220 (0.316)
Committed UN × Contact UN = Some Contact			-0.123* (0.068)
Committed UN × Contact UN = A lot of contact			-0.066 (0.072)
Constant	-0.492*** (0.121)	-0.482*** (0.125)	-0.648*** (0.122)
Observations	4,435	4,435	4,435
Mean control	0	0	0
SD	1	1	1

Note: See notes to Table 1. Robust standard errors appear in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Substitution Effects

Table 10 shows the results for institutional trust, measured as a standardized index of trust in a host of local and national-level institutions (see notes in Table 10). This tests H3a and H3b, whether third parties crowd-out (thereby decreasing) or crowd-in (thereby increasing) former combatants'

trust in domestic institutions. As above, results show null effects of the treatment, regardless of model specification.

TABLE 10: Institutional Trust

VARIABLES	Institutional trust		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Committed UN	0.007 (0.029)	0.070 (0.060)	0.016 (0.044)
Trusts UN = Doesn't know/reply	0.172 (0.145)	-0.050 (0.215)	0.156 (0.145)
Trusts UN = Yes	0.575*** (0.035)	0.619*** (0.048)	0.565*** (0.036)
Contact UN = Doesn't know/reply			0.360 (0.226)
Contact UN = Some Contact			0.061 (0.048)
Contact UN = A lot of contact			0.026 (0.053)
Committed UN × Trusts UN = Doesn't know/reply		0.439 (0.288)	
Committed UN × Trusts UN = Yes		-0.090 (0.069)	
Committed UN × Contact UN = Doesn't know/reply			-0.443 (0.325)
Committed UN × Contact UN = Some Contact			-0.044 (0.067)
Committed UN × Contact UN = A lot of contact			0.026 (0.075)
Constant	-0.248** (0.122)	-0.278** (0.124)	-0.273** (0.124)
Observations	4,435	4,435	4,435
Mean control	0	0	0
SD	1	1	1

Note: See notes to Table 1. Robust standard errors appear in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Discussion

Why did our survey experiment produce null results? Here we discuss several potential explanations and, whenever possible, marshal evidence to assess their validity.

Who Is Reassured By Third Parties?

Third-party guarantors may be best suited to reassure *high-level* former combatants, rather than foot soldiers. Given that rank-and-file ex-combatants represent the bulk of our survey sample, we may be looking “in the wrong place” for evidence that third-parties in Colombia affect ex-combatant attitudes. To rule out the possibility that not even elites were reassured by the UN Mission (given null results among foot soldiers in our experiment), we rely on qualitative interviews.

Between January and December 2020, we conducted 20 interviews with 22 individuals who are or have been involved in the negotiation and/or implementation of the 2016 peace agreement. This includes members of the UN system; high-ranking diplomats based in Colombia and representing countries active in peacebuilding; representatives of the national government responsible for demobilization and reincorporation; human rights defenders and members of civil society; and a former high commander of the FARC-EP.⁶³

The interviews reveal that the UN Mission has played an important role in reassuring ex-combatants, at least at the elite level. As a former commander of the FARC-EP said: “The [UN] Mission has had a decisive role. Whatever small amount of progress we have made is due to its presence. The pressure it has exerted is important.” Other interview subjects concurred, reporting that the UN Mission “helped to create trust...it was very important,”⁶⁴ during both the negotiation and implementation phases. A diplomat recalled when asked about the UN Mission that “FARC wants an international presence. It has a very critical position about what is happening [with the Duque government] and it sees the importance of an international presence.”⁶⁵ An embassy staff member reported that “the tripartite mechanism [composed of the UN Mission, the FARC, and government] functioned very well. The novelty was the good relationship between FARC and the Army, without notable problems. This generated trust. The Army increased its tasks in a professional manner, without bragging about victory.”⁶⁶ The head of one of the Mission’s most important regional offices stated that the UN Mission’s renewal was “made possible by the trust created dur-

⁶³Most of these interviews were conducted in person in Colombia and Spain, while a few were conducted virtually.

⁶⁴Interview 1, January 21, 2020.

⁶⁵Interview 2, January 22, 2020.

⁶⁶Interview 11, January 27, 2020.

ing the first version” of the Mission,⁶⁷ as it brought together the FARC and the Army to produce actionable security protocols for demobilizing ex-combatants.

The UN Mission’s capacity to build trust became particularly important during the transition from the Santos government, which negotiated the agreement with the FARC-EP, to the Duque administration, which according to interviewees, sought to impede agreement implementation. As a civil society leader told us, “the Duque administration implements one part of the Agreement: disarmament and reintegration. But not land [reform] and not political participation, because it is not interested in those.”⁶⁸ As a European development cooperation lead attested, “the international community has scolded [the Duque government] constantly: it has obliged the government to keep the process alive. If not, we’d now be in another context.”⁶⁹ A high-level embassy staff member mentioned that the Duque government “is very critical of the United Nations and wants to reduce its presence.”⁷⁰ Indeed, one European diplomat in Bogotá said that a few months prior to the Mission’s renewal, “I was afraid that the Duque government wouldn’t renew the mandate,” which would have torpedoed the agreement’s implementation altogether.⁷¹

Trust with elite ex-combatants—former high-level and mid-level commanders—was built in several ways. According to an experienced, senior embassy official working on peace and security issues, “the Mission did something well: it drew attention to mid-level commanders from the FARC, those who gave orders, had power and status. They [mid-level commanders] tend to have problems in other [peace] processes. The Mission was attentive to this, giving them a salary ‘plus’.”⁷² The Mission also sought to counter foot-dragging by the government, as the director of a major civil society organization expressed: after the government “took a year to establish its role” in the implementation of the agreement, the Mission “said that if the government wouldn’t do things, then they [the Mission] would.”⁷³ Because the United Nations Security Council played an active role, this provided the Mission an “impetus for this to work beyond [mere] verification.”⁷⁴ In addition to fulfilling beyond-the-mandate implementation roles, the Mission also “leads the search for resources. Perhaps in other countries these missions do not look for funds from donors.”⁷⁵ These actions, perhaps invisible to foot soldiers but visible to elite ex-combatants participating in political spaces like the Consejo Nacional de Reconciliación (CNR), signals to elite ex-combatants

⁶⁷Interview 18, March 5, 2020.

⁶⁸Interview 14, January 28, 2020.

⁶⁹Interview 12, January 28, 2020.

⁷⁰Interview 2, January 22, 2020.

⁷¹Interview 5, March 24, 2020.

⁷²Interview 11, 2020.

⁷³Interview 10, January 28, 2020.

⁷⁴Ibid.

⁷⁵Interview 9, January 27, 2020.

that the sustainability of programs that protect their lives and livelihoods depends upon the UN Mission. Despite acknowledging the importance of the roles played by the UN Mission, a former FARC commander criticized it for “not having concrete instruments to force the government, unless there is stronger support from the international community. There has been a lack of more pressure from the countries involved in the financing.”⁷⁶

The relatively high capacity for policy implementation in Colombia, when compared to other post-conflict contexts, was mentioned repeatedly by those interviewed: as a former government official said, the UN “shouldn’t be an implementer in a country like Colombia where there is capacity. Here the issue is strengthening and modernizing our state to be able to overcome conflict.”⁷⁷ The head of international cooperation within the embassy of an important donor country stated that “the role of the United Nations and international actors is there: to help the country realize reforms, confront inequalities, see how to speed up those reforms...we need to be clear about why there is [international] cooperation in a country like Colombia. We have to discuss the transition [away from cooperation], what the long-term solution is.”⁷⁸ A relatively capable state likely explains the UN’s decision not to authorize a multi-dimensional peacekeeping mission in Colombia.

Despite the comparative strength of the Colombian state, the UN Mission, “is sometimes the only institution” present in far-flung regions of the country, as the chief of one of the Mission’s regional offices mentioned.⁷⁹ An individual in the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), who previously worked in the Mission, remarked that “the value of the Mission has been its presence in the field.”⁸⁰ This presence in the hinterlands provides concrete benefits: the chief of one of the Mission’s areas said that “if it weren’t for the [Mission’s] local teams who are in the field, the ‘raw materials’ [that decision-makers receive] in Bogotá would be different...and they form the basis of the reports sent to New York.”⁸¹ Despite the lack of boots on the ground, there is a perception that the Mission’s monitoring actions are themselves important: a member of civil society said that “for the majority of actors the presence of the Verification Component is crucial: it has significant capacity to influence, as each report has international repercussions.”⁸²

From the elite interviews we can conclude that the UN Mission is generally seen to be (a) important; (b) strong, and perhaps even stronger than the mandate itself suggests; (c) capable of reassuring elite FARC ex-combatants; while (d) to some extent tying the hands of a government

⁷⁶Interview 3, January 23, 2020.

⁷⁷Interview 1, January 21, 2020.

⁷⁸Interview 2, January 22, 2020.

⁷⁹Interview 18, March 5, 2020.

⁸⁰Interview 9, January 27, 2020.

⁸¹Interview 7, January 23, 2020.

⁸²Interview 15, January 28, 2020.

uninterested in implementation, or that actively sought to undermine the agreement. If elites were affected by the UN Mission, why do our experimental survey results show no effect on foot soldiers? We discuss additional alternatives below.

The Wrong Kind of Mission?

The literature has distinguished between four types of missions.⁸³ (1) monitoring and observer missions, which simply observe and report on cease-fire violations; (2) traditional peacekeeping missions, which involve lightly armed troops that physically place themselves between adversaries to secure a cease-fire, and may also include disarmament and demobilization actions; (3) peacebuilding missions (sometimes known as “multi-dimensional peacekeeping”), which include the former aspects but also involve deep structural changes to the state, such as electoral reforms and beyond; and (4) peace enforcement missions, which “involve the use of military force to end hostilities between warring sides.” Some studies find that specific types of UN missions—multidimensional missions—have positive effects on peacebuilding success,⁸⁴ while others—observation missions—have more limited effects.⁸⁵ Others find that *any* kind of third-party intervention—regardless of mission type—has positive effects on the consolidation and duration of peace.⁸⁶

Monitoring and observer and traditional peacekeeping missions—which are not mandated to use force—are the most common types,⁸⁷ yet have been comparatively understudied. They are equally effective in preventing conflict recurrence when compared to more muscular missions,⁸⁸ even though they do not involve boots on the ground, naturally making them more cost-effective. They also may be less prone to pathologies afflicting missions charged with wielding force, including human rights abuses⁸⁹ and disruptions to local economies.⁹⁰

Colombia combines aspects of monitoring and observer missions and traditional peacekeeping missions. One interpretation for our null findings might be that the UN Verification Mission in Colombia is not a peacebuilding or peace enforcement mission with blue helmets on the ground. Perhaps we have set the bar too high: Colombia’s mission never sought the wholesale transforma-

⁸³Sandler 2017.

⁸⁴Walter, Howard and Fortna 2021.

⁸⁵Doyle and Sambanis 2000.

⁸⁶Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild 2001.

⁸⁷Matanock 2020.

⁸⁸Matanock and Lichtenheld 2022.

⁸⁹Jennings and Nikolić-Ristanović 2009.

⁹⁰Jennings and Bøås 2015. For a dissenting view on the negative economic consequences of boots on the ground, see Bove, Salvatore and Elia 2022.

tion of the state or the rule of law,⁹¹ making this an impossibly tough case for third-party assurance theories. We do not believe that this explanation captures dynamics on the ground. The Mission's tasks in Colombia are well-aligned with core characteristics of the United Nation's different peacekeeping strategies used to tackle conflict globally. For instance, multidimensional peacekeeping overcame traditional peacekeeping because it consisted of integrated missions that combined presence of blue helmets with political, social and economic interventions that aimed for long-run, self-sustaining peace. Even though the Mission's actions in Colombia have not been as direct as coordinating election processes (as in Mozambique with UNUMOZ in 1992, for example), they have contributed to preserving peace and development in post-conflict Colombia. For example, during the 2018 electoral campaign period, the Mission identified risks to members of the political party that emerged from the demobilization of the FARC-EP. In conjunction with the National Protection Unit, the Mission offered a tripartite protection and security mechanism that built a national headquarters and ten regional headquarters where the party could carry out its activities. It also designed a roadmap to address the needs of women involved in political activities.⁹²

Recent work⁹³ shows that UN peacekeeping missions produce “unique tactical, symbolic, and post-conflict reconstruction outcomes that have little to do with the end of fighting.” The benefits that combatants receive from UN assistance may be achieved even absent peacekeepers on the ground, or when peacekeepers are not themselves effective.

In addition to symbolic benefits, the UN Mission in Colombia has also produced tangible economic benefits for ex-combatant communities. Through March 2019, the Mission helped finance 34 income-generating projects led by former combatants,⁹⁴ in addition to women-led entrepreneurship programs in urban areas.⁹⁵ In parallel, the Mission has verified the living conditions of ex-combatants as they undertake reincorporation: if conditions are deemed unsatisfactory, the Mission works alongside the government and FARC leadership to provide services directly.⁹⁶ The most recent extension of its mission included the verification of sanctions imposed by the country's transitional justice court, the JEP (for its acronym in Spanish), created by the peace agreement to prosecute crimes committed during the conflict. This “proactive verification role”—one clear sign of a solid mission⁹⁷—aims to help parties overcome obstacles that may arise following an agree-

⁹¹Blair 2021.

⁹²UN 2018b.

⁹³See Dayal 2021, p. 1.

⁹⁴Along with the UNDP and support from France, Norway, Sweden and the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs.

⁹⁵UN 2019.

⁹⁶UN 2017b, 2018b.

⁹⁷García 2017.

ment’s signing.⁹⁸ Our own survey data reveals that 55% of respondents report having had direct contact with the UN Verification Mission at least “sometimes,” confirming its frontline role. An armed presence with boots on the ground is likely not the mechanism through which a third party contributes to the consolidation of peace.

Lack of Trust by Ex-Combatants or Lack of Contact?

Another potential explanation for the null results is that the UN Verification Mission may not have won over ex-combatants. As such, reminding them of the third party guarantor’s commitment may not produce reassurance. We can rule out this explanation using our survey data. We asked (prior to treatment) whether ex-combatants trust the UN: as Figure 2 shows (left panel), they overwhelmingly do so. 56% report that they trust the UN Verification Mission “a lot,” while another 21% said “somewhat,” while only 19% and 2% reported “very little” and “not at all,” respectively. We also observe that this is not an artifact of lack of contact: Figure 3 shows, if anything, that trust is *increasing* in levels of reported contact with the UN Mission.⁹⁹




FIGURE 2: *Ex-combatants’ trust in and their exposure to third parties*

⁹⁸García and Pérez de Armiño 2022.

⁹⁹For these graphs we use a dichotomized trust variable, where “trusts” takes a value of 1 if a respondent answered that they trusted the UN Verification Mission “a lot” or “somewhat” and a value of 0 if they responded “very little” or “not at all”. In Appendix D we show that high levels of trust can be found both among ex-combatants living in ETCRs—who are more likely to be exposed to UN Verification Mission personnel—and those living outside these areas.




FIGURE 3: *Trust in third parties by level of contact*

Note: This figure shows the distribution of trust in the UN within given ex-combatants' self-reported frequency of direct contact with the UN. Refer to Section "Experimental Design" for detail on variable construction.

Ex-combatants may also need to have sustained contact with third parties for guarantees of protection to be rendered credible: Blair¹⁰⁰ shows that individual-level interactions with UN personnel have a positive effect on supporting rule of law norms within countries featuring UN peacekeeping missions. Perhaps those in our sample did not have such sustained contact. But this is not the case: more than half of our sample reported either "a lot" or "some contact" with the UN Verification Mission. And we find no evidence that the treatment affected these ex-combatants differently than those having less contact with the UN Mission (see Tables 1-4 above).

¹⁰⁰Blair 2021.

Underpowered Experiment or Weak Treatment?

Our survey experiment may have been underpowered, hindering our ability to detect statistically significant effects of the treatment if they indeed existed. We can rule out this explanation, as well. We performed ex-post power calculations for two of our main outcomes: i) how confident respondents are that the government will follow through with its commitments, and ii) how confident respondents are that the FARC-EP will likewise follow through. Specifically, we used the empirical distribution of the control group for each question to set the parameters for our simulation-based calculation of minimum detectable effects (MDEs). We dichotomize the dependent variable so that effect sizes can be interpreted as changes in proportions.

Our ex-post power calculations are depicted in Figure 4: for a sample size of $N = 4,435$, our design allows us to detect treatment effects as small as 0.046 for the government outcome and 0.032 for the FARC outcome. Overall, we are well-powered to detect effects that we believe are sizable and relevant from a policy perspective.¹⁰¹

A related concern is that perhaps the treatment was not strong enough to move outcomes, or that a survey experiment in and of itself is not a useful tool for studying these questions. While randomizing exposure to the mission itself would have been ideal, this was clearly infeasible. The data indicate, however, that our vignette was not without impact. In response to the treatment question about the renewal of the Mission’s mandate, approximately 35.1% of respondents answered that they had not known this prior to our prompt, suggesting that at a minimum the information presented was novel to a sizable portion of the sample.

To check whether respondents’ perceptions were moved *at all* by the treatment, we included the following question at the end of the survey: “[d]o you know if the mandate of the UN Verification Mission has been extended?” with respondents given two options: “yes, it has been extended,” or “no, it has not been extended.” We code a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent answers that it has been extended, and 0 otherwise (e.g. if the respondent answers “no,” does not know, or does not answer). In response to this manipulation check, approximately 69.7% reported “yes,” 7.6% answered “no” and 22.7% of respondents didn’t know or didn’t reply. For those who were treated, 72.4% responded “yes”, 6.7% responded “no” and 20.9% didn’t know or didn’t reply. For the control group, 66.9% of respondents answered “yes”, 8.4% answered “no” and 24.66% didn’t know or didn’t reply.

We test whether these differences are statistically significant. Figure 5 shows that our treatment

¹⁰¹Consistent with this, the null findings hold after including covariates predictive of our main outcomes of interest (see Section F for results of estimations using the lasso covariate selector).




FIGURE 4: *Power calculations via simulation*

Note: Randomization process: We conduct power calculations using a simulation mimicking our research design. We replicate hypothetical experiments with a block-randomized design assigning subjects to either T0 (control) or T1 (treatment). The randomization strategy stratifies based on ex-combatants’ trust in the UN.

Parameters of the simulations: For both simulations, $N = 4,335$. For the simulation of confidence in government follow-through, the mean for those who trust the UN is 44.93%; 23.95% for those who do not; and 41.17% for those who do not know or do not reply. For the simulation of confidence in FARC’s follow-through, the mean for those who trust the UN is equal to 88.79%; 69.84% for those who do not; and 80% for those who do not know or do not respond.

increases by approximately 5% the proportion of individuals who correctly answered this question that the mission had been extended, suggesting that our treatment was not weak. When using an instrumental variable to estimate the effect of the treatment only for those moved by the manipulation check, we still find no evidence that our treatment improved confidence in the process, or induced more optimistic views. The results for all IV estimations can be found in Appendix E.




FIGURE 5: *Proportion of respondents who answers correctly the manipulation check by treatment condition. Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals.*

Note: We create a dummy from the answers to the manipulation check question “Do you know if the mandate of the UN Verification Mission has been extended?” which takes the value of 1 if the respondent answered correctly—“yes, it has been extended”—and 0 if the respondent answered incorrectly—“no, it has not been extended.”

By ruling out several explanations for our null results, this section has a few takeaways. Although we recover no evidence of an impact of third-party assurances in our survey experiment, our elite interviews tell a different story. The UN Mission has been crucial to reassure elite ex-combatants (at the least), pushing a recalcitrant government to implement and even taking on crucial functions not initially within its purview. This divergence between elite and rank-and-file results should prompt us to reflect on the kind of evidence used to test arguments about the challenges facing post-conflict societies. We cannot simply impute reassurance to foot soldiers because we find evidence for reassurance at the elite level. Relatedly, our study should push us to understand under what conditions third-party-induced reassurance trickles down from elite ex-combatants to former foot soldiers.

Conclusion

Third parties charged with monitoring and enforcing peace agreements are thought to be central to the consolidation of peace after civil war. International organizations like the UN reassure warring parties of their safety in the face of changing power dynamics, endowing former belligerents with the ability to make credible commitments and to render agreements enforceable, reducing the probability of conflict recurrence. A large literature, oftentimes relying on cross-national regressions and case studies of UN Missions, has shown how third parties accomplish this task.

But third-parties are also crucial to peace agreement implementation once the immediate risk of conflict relapse has faded. We argue that international third-parties take on novel roles—funding programs and ensuring access to basic services for the demobilized population, coordinating disparate institutions involved in agreement implementation, providing security and legal guarantees to ex-combatants, and facilitating foot soldiers’ social and political reincorporation—that have the potential to reassure foot soldiers over the medium and long-term.

We conduct pre-registered survey experiments with a large ex-combatant population in Colombia. Reminding 4,435 FARC-EP ex-combatants about the UN Mission’s recent mandate extension, we measure whether the UN Mission positively affects ex-combatants’ perceptions regarding the perceived likelihood of follow-through by the government and the FARC; perceptions of physical safety; prospective economic outcomes; attitudes about truth and reconciliation; willingness to tell others they were once members of the FARC-EP; interpersonal trust; and trust in institutions. Our experimental treatment did not move combatant attitudes across any of these outcomes. In other words, we fail to recover micro-level evidence that international assurances affect rank-and-file combatants’ perceptions during peace agreement implementation.

We are able to discard some explanations for our null findings: for example, that the UN Mission is simply “window-dressing,” that contact between the UN Mission and ex-combatants is limited, and that the experiment is underpowered. By ruling out alternative explanations, and by encouraging similar data collection efforts in other post-conflict contexts, we begin a conversation about potential scope conditions for third-party assurance theories in post-war contexts, particularly during the implementation phase.

As countries struggle to emerge from armed conflict, it is crucial to better understand what kinds of programs and policies offered by third-parties and national governments could more effectively facilitate ex-combatants’ transition to civilian life. Taking into account the particular needs and concerns of foot soldiers—rather than focusing principally on mid-level commanders and high-level officials—is essential to help maximize the chances that these transitions will be both successful and lasting.

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Online Appendix for: “Do Third-Party Guarantors Reassure Foot Soldiers?”

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
A Additional information about the survey

A.1 Survey Rollout

Anonymized information regarding the full universe of FARC ex-combatants was provided by the *Agencia para la Reincorporación y la Normalización* (ARN), the presidential agency responsible for ensuring FARC-EP's reincorporation into civilian life. It contained 14,094 records, of whom 12,028 individuals were active in their respective reincorporation processes. 11,374 of these 12,028 individuals had a valid registered phone number associated with them. This became the universe for the survey.

Based on this information, 73 territorial clusters were constructed to most efficiently carry out the surveys, establish detailed follow-up procedures, and analyze potential causes of attrition. Each individual was randomly assigned by the survey firm to a week—week 1 or week 2, initially (see below)—when he/she would be contacted. These clusters are represented in Figure A.1.

FIGURE A.1: *Clusters for contact strategy*



Fieldwork was supposed to be completed during 4 weeks in December: all ex-combatants were

to be contacted during the first 2 weeks, and the following 2 weeks would be used to recontact those who had not yet answered. However, given a low response rate during the first 2 weeks and a significant drop in effective surveys during week 3 (likely due to the Christmas holidays), we suspended surveys in December and resumed during the second and third week of January. We therefore include cluster and contact-phase dummies to account for these features of the sampling procedure.

In addition, the survey firm provided us with information on the status of each person in the universe of ex-combatants at the end of the field operation. For those who did not complete the survey, a description was included as to why it was not possible to make effective contact. The main reasons were because the respondent did not answer the call; he/she was not interested in participating; the telephone number in the ARN database was incorrect; or because the number was out of service.

Description	Frequency
Effective contact (survey completed)	4,435
Voicemail - No answer	4,566
Respondent is not interested in participating	778
Wrong number	535
Out of service	383
Call failure (technical)	232
Respondent is busy	177
Respondent is away	112
Respondent does not accept data protection policy	70
New contact phone number	21
Respondent deceased	6
No description	59
Total	11,374

A.2 Socio-demographic characteristics of ex-combatants in universe and sample

To increase response rates among a hard-to-reach and potentially resistant population, we worked both with local facilitators from the ARN and with representatives of the FARC component of the CNR before launching the survey. ARN facilitators are frontline state agents responsible for ensuring that ex-combatants receive benefits related to their reincorporation processes ¹⁰². The FARC component of the CNR encouraged us to work with the *Fundación Colombiana de Ex-combatientes y Promotores de Paz* (FUCEPAZ), the first legal, non-profit organization that FARC

¹⁰²Fergusson et al. (2022).

established, which has close contacts with ex-combatant communities in the field. Before initiating fieldwork, both ARN and FUCEPAZ reached out to the study population to inform them that a survey firm would be calling them to ask questions about reincorporation. They also clarified that participation would be completely voluntary, refusal would not entail any consequences in terms of the benefits to which they are entitled, and that we would take every step to protect their privacy in accordance with IRB requirements. The ARN carried out this dissemination strategy throughout the country through text messages and facilitator contacts, while FUCEPAZ did the same via targeted phone calls to key representatives in hard-to reach communities, to whom they also distributed a presentation with key information and a short instructional video.¹⁰³

Prior to launching the survey, the polling firm also sent a text message to the full universe of ex-combatants to inform them that they would be contacted in the following weeks. In January, once fieldwork had been underway for a few weeks, SEI sent an additional two text messages to respondents who hadn't yet answered the call from the survey firm, or had a phone that was reported out of service, to remind them that the survey was still active, to ask if they would like to be contacted in the future and, if so, to find a convenient time to respond.

The maps in Figure A.2 show the distribution of ex-combatants in Colombia, using data from the ARN. Ex-combatants are mainly concentrated in the departments of Meta (1,312 ex-combatants), Antioquia (1,251 ex-combatants) and Cauca (1,137 ex-combatants). At the municipal level, the population is located principally in Bogotá, the capital and largest city in the country, and otherwise in comparatively more rural municipalities like San José del Guaviare, Arauquita, and Icononzo.

¹⁰³FUCEPAZ engaged in the following communities: Vereda El Oso, Planadas, Tolima; Vereda Nueva Esperanza, Mesetas, Meta; Vereda Buenavista, Mesetas, Meta; Vereda Colinas, San José del Guaviare, Guaviare; Vereda Charras, San Jose del Guaviare, Guaviare; Vereda Mutatá, Antioquia; Vereda Tierra Grata, San Jose de Oriente, Cesar; Vereda Santa Rosa de Tetuan, San Antonio, Tolima; Vereda la Cooperativa, Vistahermosa, Meta; Ovejas, Sincelejo; Palmitos, Montes de María, Sucre; Corregimiento Pueblo Rico, Santa Cecilia, Antioquia; urban area of Chaparral, Tolima; Vereda La Pista, Uribe, Meta; Vereda La Fila, Icononzo, Tolima; Sector Kilómetro 8, Vereda Nuevo Quibdó, Chocó.






FIGURE A.2: *Distribution of the ex-combatant population in Colombia as of November 2021*

Ex-combatants’ location of residence can be divided into two groups: those who live in municipalities with former *Espacios Territoriales de Capacitación y Reincorporación* (ETCRs)—areas created by the peace agreement to encourage demobilization and reincorporation in rural zones—and those who reside in municipalities without former ETCRs. According to ARN data, as of November 2021 there were a total of 2,233 ex-combatants—approximately, 19.63% of the total—living in former ETCRs. Information on place of residence is available for the totality of this population. Those living in former ETCRs are mainly concentrated in the departments of Meta, Antioquia, Guaviare, Tolima, and Caquetá, and in the municipalities of San José del Guaviare, Icononzo, Arauquita and La Montañita. A total of 9,101 ex-combatants—approximately, 80.37% of the universe—did not live in former ETCRs as of November 2021. As the maps in Figure A.2 show, these ex-combatants are predominantly located in the departments of Meta, Cauca, Antioquia and Bogotá, D.C., and mainly live in large cities such as Bogotá, Villavicencio, and Medellín.

The average age of our sample is approximately 40 years old; the youngest respondent is 20 and the oldest 85 years old. Of the total number of respondents, 27% (1,197) self-identify as female and 73% (3,238) as male. As Figure A.3 shows, approximately 83% (3,691) of our respondents do not live in a former ETCR, while the other 17% (744) do so.



(a) *By departments*



(b) *By municipalities*

FIGURE A.3: *Location of ex-combatants in our sample between December 2021 - January 2022*




FIGURE A.4: *Distribution of ex-combatants in our sample between December 2021 - January 2022 by ARN territorial groups*

B Descriptive Statistics

TABLE A.1: *Summary statistics for the variables used in the main analyses*

	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Trust UN	4435	2.76	0.46	1.00	3.00
Contact UN	4435	1.80	0.84	0.00	3.00
Follow-through: Govt	4388	0.00	1.00	-1.39	2.28
Follow-through: FARC	4337	0.02	0.99	-2.61	0.99
How willing is the population in your municipality to reconcile	4324	0.02	1.00	-2.36	1.07
How willing is the population in Colombia in general to reconcile	4357	0.02	1.01	-2.72	1.28
Cautious in reporting FARC membership	4396	-0.02	1.01	-2.22	0.64
Reconciliation via: truth	4393	-0.00	1.00	-2.64	0.95
Reconciliation via: forgiveness	4386	0.00	0.98	-2.69	0.85
Institutional trust	4435	0.00	1.00	-3.59	2.41
Interpersonal trust	4435	0.02	1.00	-4.55	2.66
Economic perspectives	4332	-0.00	1.00	-3.08	0.50
Safety risks	4364	0.67	0.47	0.00	1.00

TABLE A.2: *Summary statistics for the variables in scale version*

	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Follow-through: Govt	4388	2.52	1.09	1.00	5.00
Follow-through: FARC	4337	3.92	1.10	1.00	5.00
Economic perspectives	4332	1.72	0.56	0.00	2.00
How willing is the population in your municipality to reconcile	4324	3.09	0.87	1.00	4.00
How willing is the population in Colombia in general to reconcile	4357	3.06	0.76	1.00	4.00
Cautious in reporting FARC membership	4396	3.31	1.06	1.00	4.00
Reconciliation via: truth	4393	3.94	1.12	1.00	5.00
Reconciliation via: forgiveness	4386	4.04	1.11	1.00	5.00
Trust ARN	4415	3.46	0.76	1.00	4.00
Trust Mayor	4360	2.36	0.98	1.00	4.00
Trust National Govt.	4414	2.19	0.93	1.00	4.00
Trust Congress	4380	2.09	0.90	1.00	4.00
Trust Colombian Armed Forces	4402	2.30	0.99	1.00	4.00
Trust Police	4401	2.12	0.97	1.00	4.00
Trust your family	4415	3.67	0.67	1.00	4.00
Trust your friends	4409	2.48	0.92	1.00	4.00
Trust your neighbors	4413	2.44	0.92	1.00	4.00
Trust other FARC	4391	2.77	0.91	1.00	4.00
Trust strangers	4417	1.40	0.68	1.00	4.00

TABLE A.3: *Correlation between trust in the UN Verification mission and main outcomes of interest*


Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
(1) Trust UN	1.000														
(2) Plan to vote in 2022 presidential election	0.062	1.000													
(3) Follow-through: Govt	0.126	0.031	1.000												
(4) Follow-through: FARC	0.172	0.078	0.157	1.000											
(5) Gov. committed to protecting reincorporados	0.059	0.037	0.435	0.042	1.000										
(6) Local authorities committed to protecting reincorporados	0.070	0.058	0.348	0.075	0.527	1.000									
(7) How willing is the population in your municipality to reconcile	0.138	0.061	0.165	0.212	0.128	0.165	1.000								
(8) How willing is the population in Colombia in general to reconcile	0.142	0.061	0.200	0.226	0.133	0.145	0.396	1.000							
(9) Cautious in reporting FARC membership	0.023	0.027	0.055	0.059	0.022	0.010	0.112	0.083	1.000						
(10) Reconciliation via: truth	0.165	0.024	0.073	0.251	-0.010	0.030	0.227	0.218	0.101	1.000					
(11) Reconciliation via: forgiveness	0.158	0.039	0.072	0.258	0.027	0.058	0.187	0.209	0.096	0.481	1.000				
(12) Institutional trust	0.217	0.096	0.534	0.142	0.451	0.440	0.246	0.257	0.075	0.134	0.140	1.000			
(13) Interpersonal trust	0.187	0.118	0.133	0.238	0.060	0.133	0.278	0.242	0.055	0.222	0.215	0.342	1.000		
(14) Economic perspectives	0.088	0.060	0.172	0.053	0.157	0.148	0.067	0.079	0.006	0.059	0.023	0.192	0.062	1.000	
(15) Safety risks	-0.022	0.008	-0.236	0.035	-0.234	-0.195	-0.065	-0.075	0.011	0.047	0.000	-0.264	-0.074	-0.095	1.000

TABLE A.4: *Correlation between contact with the UN Verification mission and main outcomes of interest*

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
(1) Contact UN	1.000														
(2) Plan to vote in 2022 presidential election	0.088	1.000													
(3) Follow-through: Govt	-0.014	0.031	1.000												
(4) Follow-through: FARC	0.126	0.078	0.157	1.000											
(5) Gov. committed to protecting reincorporados	-0.005	0.037	0.435	0.042	1.000										
(6) Local authorities committed to protecting reincorporados	0.050	0.058	0.348	0.075	0.527	1.000									
(7) How willing is the population in your municipality to reconcile	0.182	0.061	0.165	0.212	0.128	0.165	1.000								
(8) How willing is the population in Colombia in general to reconcile	0.116	0.061	0.200	0.226	0.133	0.145	0.396	1.000							
(9) Cautious in reporting FARC membership	0.045	0.027	0.055	0.059	0.022	0.010	0.112	0.083	1.000						
(10) Reconciliation via: truth	0.104	0.024	0.073	0.251	-0.010	0.030	0.227	0.218	0.101	1.000					
(11) Reconciliation via: forgiveness	0.111	0.039	0.072	0.258	0.027	0.058	0.187	0.209	0.096	0.481	1.000				
(12) Institutional trust	0.060	0.096	0.534	0.142	0.451	0.440	0.246	0.257	0.075	0.134	0.140	1.000			
(13) Interpersonal trust	0.183	0.118	0.133	0.238	0.060	0.133	0.278	0.242	0.055	0.222	0.215	0.342	1.000		
(14) Economic perspectives	0.031	0.060	0.172	0.053	0.157	0.148	0.067	0.079	0.006	0.059	0.023	0.192	0.062	1.000	
(15) Safety risks	0.036	0.008	-0.236	0.035	-0.234	-0.195	-0.065	-0.075	0.011	0.047	0.000	-0.264	-0.074	-0.095	1.000


C Former FARC combatants' level of trust in and frequency of interactions with the UN Verification Mission

FIGURE A.5: Frequency of direct contact with a member of third parties by level of trust



Note: This figure shows the distribution of frequency of contact with the UN given different levels of trust in the UN. The frequency of direct contact question is: “In the last 12 months, how often have you, a member of your family, or a close friend had direct contact with a member of the UN Verification Mission in Colombia?” Those who answered “always” or “almost always” were coded as having had “a lot of contact”; those who answered “sometimes” were coded as having had “some contact”; those who answered “almost never” or “never” were coded as having had “little contact”; while those who did not know or did not answer were coded as “doesn’t know or did not reply”. The trust in the UN Mission question is: “How much do you trust the UN Verification Mission?”. The trust variable is: “how much do you trust the UN Verification Mission?” where those who responded “a lot” or “somewhat” are coded as trusting the UN; those who responded “very little” or “not at all” are coded as not trusting the UN; and those who do not know or did not reply are coded as “does not know or did not reply.”

FIGURE A.6: *Trust in third parties by level of contact (measured by living in former ETCRs)*



D Regressions with heterogeneous treatment effects by ETCR

TABLE A.5: *Confidence in the Government to Implement the Peace Agreement: ETCR interaction*

VARIABLES	Follow-through: Govt	
	(1)	(2)
Committed UN	0.003 (0.034)	0.002 (0.033)
ETCR = 1	-0.320*** (0.051)	-0.325*** (0.050)
Committed UN × ETCR = 1	0.041 (0.072)	0.033 (0.072)
Trusts UN = Doesn't know/reply		0.457*** (0.130)
Trusts UN = Yes		0.393*** (0.034)
Constant	0.054** (0.024)	-0.258*** (0.035)
Observations	4,388	4,388
Control mean	2.51	2.51
Control SD	1.09	1.09

Note: The dependent variable is: “How confident are you that the National Government will comply with the Peace Agreement?” We classified the answers as follows: equal to 1 if the respondent answered “not at all”, equal to 2 if it was answered “very little”, equal to 3 if it was answered “somewhat”, equal to 4 if it was answered “a lot”, equal to 5 if it was answered “completely”. Committed UN is a treatment indicator that takes the value of 1 for respondents assigned to the experimental prime. Blocks correspond to respondents’ trust in the UN: Doesn’t trust (baseline), Trusts, and doesn’t answer question or doesn’t know. We did not consider observations where the respondent answered “Does not know” or “Does not reply”. We then summed all answers and generated a standardized z-score, as described in Section H. In (2) we include fixed effects by stratification block where the base group is those who do not trust the UN. Robust standard errors appear in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

TABLE A.6: *Confidence in the FARC-EP to Implement the Peace Agreement: ETCR interaction*

VARIABLES	Follow-through: FARC	
	(1)	(2)
Committed UN	0.041 (0.033)	0.041 (0.033)
ETCR = 1	0.236*** (0.055)	0.229*** (0.054)
Committed UN × ETCR = 1	-0.044 (0.077)	-0.057 (0.076)
Trusts UN = Doesn't know/reply		0.106 (0.132)
Trusts UN = Yes		0.432*** (0.041)
Constant	-0.039* (0.024)	-0.376*** (0.042)
Observations	4,337	4,337
Control mean	3.90	3.90
Control SD	1.11	1.11

Note: The dependent variable is: “How confident are you that the Signatories of the FARC-EP will comply with the Peace Agreement?” We classified the answers as follows: equal to 1 if the respondent answered “not at all”, equal to 2 if it was answered “very little”, equal to 3 if it was answered “somewhat”, equal to 4 if it was answered “a lot”, equal to 5 if it was answered “completely”. Committed UN is a treatment indicator that takes the value of 1 for respondents assigned to the experimental prime. Blocks correspond to respondents’ trust in the UN: Doesn’t trust (baseline), Trusts, and doesn’t answer question or doesn’t know. We did not consider observations where the respondent answered “Does not know” or “Does not reply”. We then summed all answers and generated a standardized z-score, as described in Section H. See the note in the table A.5 for methodological remarks. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

TABLE A.7: Safety Risks Given Reincorporation Process: ETCR interaction

VARIABLES	Safety risks	
	(1)	(2)
Committed UN	0.020 (0.016)	0.021 (0.016)
ETCR = 1	0.117*** (0.025)	0.118*** (0.025)
Committed UN \times ETCR = 1	-0.057 (0.036)	-0.057 (0.036)
Trusts UN = Doesn't know/reply		-0.184*** (0.061)
Trusts UN = Yes		-0.057*** (0.017)
Constant	0.646*** (0.011)	0.693*** (0.017)
Observations	4,364	4,364
Control mean	0.67	0.67
Control SD	0.47	0.47

Note: The dependent variable is: “Do you or your household consider that there is a risk for being in the reincorporation process?” We created a dummy variable equal to 0 if the respondent answered “no” and equal to 1 if it was answered “yes”. Committed UN is a treatment indicator that takes the value of 1 for respondents assigned to the experimental prime. Blocks correspond to respondents’ trust in the UN: Doesn’t trust (baseline), Trusts, and doesn’t answer question or doesn’t know. We did not consider observations where the respondent answered “Does not know” or “Does not reply”. See the note in the table A.5 for methodological remarks. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

TABLE A.8: Prospective Economic Situation: ETCR interaction

VARIABLES	Economic perspectives	
	(1)	(2)
Committed UN	0.006 (0.033)	0.005 (0.033)
ETCR = 1	-0.042 (0.057)	-0.047 (0.057)
Committed UN \times ETCR = 1	-0.065 (0.081)	-0.069 (0.080)
Trusts UN = Doesn't know/reply		0.214 (0.140)
Trusts UN = Yes		0.255*** (0.042)
Constant	0.007 (0.024)	-0.194*** (0.043)
Observations	4,332	4,332
Control mean	1.72	1.72
Control SD	0.56	0.56

Note: The dependent variable is: “When you think about the future, how do you think your financial situation and that of your household will be in the next 12 months?” We classified the answers as follows: equal to 0 if the respondent answered “worse”, equal to 1 if it was answered “the same”, equal to 2 if it was answered “better”. Committed UN is a treatment indicator that takes the value of 1 for respondents assigned to the experimental prime. Blocks correspond to respondents’ trust in the UN: Doesn’t trust (baseline), Trusts, and doesn’t answer question or doesn’t know. We did not consider observations where the respondent answered “Does not know” or “Does not reply”. We then summed all answers and generated a standardized z-score, as described in Section H. See the note in the table A.5 for methodological remarks. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

E IV Regressions

TABLE A.9: *Confidence in the Government to Implement the Peace Agreement: IV Regressions*

VARIABLES	Follow-through: Govt		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Trusts UN = Doesn't know/reply	0.444*** (0.150)	0.770 (1.387)	0.406*** (0.136)
Trusts UN = Yes	0.358*** (0.077)	0.574 (1.371)	0.367*** (0.080)
Contact UN = Doesn't know/reply			0.784 (0.583)
Contact UN = Some Contact			0.136 (0.551)
Contact UN = A lot of contact			0.084 (0.565)
Manipulation check dummy	0.107 (0.523)	0.367 (2.306)	0.296 (0.848)
Man. check = Yes × Block = Doesn't know/reply		-0.635 (2.323)	
Man. check = Yes × Block = Trusts		-0.346 (2.305)	
Man. check = Yes × Contact UN = Doesn't know/reply			-0.992 (0.872)
Man. check = Yes × Contact UN = Some Contact			-0.279 (0.848)
Man. check = Yes × Contact UN = A lot of contact			-0.293 (0.852)
Constant	-0.136 (0.336)	-0.284 (1.338)	-0.215 (0.526)
Observations	4,388	4,388	4,388
Control mean	2.51	2.51	2.51
Control SD	1.09	1.09	1.09

Note: The dependent variable is: “How confident are you that the National Government will comply with the Peace Agreement?” We classified the answers as follows: equal to 1 if the respondent answered “not at all”, equal to 2 if it was answered “very little”, equal to 3 if it was answered “somewhat”, equal to 4 if it was answered “a lot”, equal to 5 if it was answered “completely”. Committed UN is a treatment indicator that takes the value of 1 for respondents assigned to the experimental prime. Blocks correspond to respondents’ trust in the UN: Doesn’t trust (baseline), Trusts, and doesn’t answer question or doesn’t know. We did not consider observations where the respondent answered “Does not know” or “Does not reply”. We then summed all answers and generated a standardized z-score, as described in Section H. In (2), we estimate heterogeneous treatment effects by stratum block. In (3), we also include fixed effects and estimate heterogeneous treatment effects by frequency of contact with the UN. This variable was created from the question: “In the last 12 months, how often have you, a member of your family or a close friend had direct contact with a member of the UN Verification Mission in Colombia?” Those who answered “always” or “almost always” were assigned to the “high contact” group; those who answered “sometimes” were assigned to the “some contact” group; those who answered “almost never” or “never” were assigned to the “low contact” group; finally, those who didn’t know or didn’t answer were assigned to the “don’t know or don’t answer” group. The base group for this variable is the “Little Contact” group. Finally, we include fixed effects by strata of the sampling procedure. Robust standard errors appear in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

TABLE A.10: Confidence in the FARC-EP to Implement the Peace Agreement: IV Regressions

VARIABLES	Follow-through: FARC		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Trusts UN = Doesn't know/reply	0.172 (0.149)	1.363 (1.315)	0.142 (0.144)
Trusts UN = Yes	0.300*** (0.082)	1.524 (1.301)	0.274*** (0.084)
Contact UN = Doesn't know/reply			0.238 (0.567)
Contact UN = Some Contact			0.527 (0.540)
Contact UN = A lot of contact			0.687 (0.550)
Manipulation check dummy	0.688 (0.525)	2.128 (2.187)	0.840 (0.822)
Man. check = Yes × Block = Doesn't know/reply		-2.132 (2.206)	
Man. check = Yes × Block = Trusts		-1.949 (2.189)	
Man. check = Yes × Contact UN = Doesn't know/reply			-0.478 (0.852)
Man. check = Yes × Contact UN = Some Contact			-0.662 (0.824)
Man. check = Yes × Contact UN = A lot of contact			-0.737 (0.828)
Constant	-0.863*** (0.333)	-1.682 (1.270)	-1.026** (0.513)
Observations	4,337	4,337	4,337
Control mean	3.90	3.90	3.90
Control SD	1.11	1.11	1.11

Note: The dependent variable is: “How confident are you that the Signatories of the FARC-EP will comply with the Peace Agreement?” We classified the answers as follows: equal to 1 if the respondent answered “not at all”, equal to 2 if it was answered “very little”, equal to 3 if it was answered “somewhat”, equal to 4 if it was answered “a lot”, equal to 5 if it was answered “completely”. Committed UN is a treatment indicator that takes the value of 1 for respondents assigned to the experimental prime. Blocks correspond to respondents’ trust in the UN: Doesn’t trust (baseline), Trusts, and doesn’t answer question or doesn’t know. We did not consider observations where the respondent answered “Does not know” or “Does not reply”. We then summed all answers and generated a standardized z-score, as described in Section H. See the note in the table A.9 for methodological remarks. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

TABLE A.11: Safety Risks Given Reincorporation Process: IV Regressions

VARIABLES	Safety risks		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Trusts UN = Doesn't know/reply	-0.150** (0.067)	0.249 (0.707)	-0.157** (0.064)
Trusts UN = Yes	-0.071* (0.038)	0.407 (0.701)	-0.076** (0.038)
Contact UN = Doesn't know/reply			0.073 (0.268)
Contact UN = Some Contact			0.194 (0.256)
Contact UN = A lot of contact			0.161 (0.262)
Manipulation check dummy	0.182 (0.258)	0.769 (1.172)	0.228 (0.392)
Man. check = Yes × Block = Doesn't know/reply		-0.688 (1.181)	
Man. check = Yes × Block = Trusts		-0.762 (1.173)	
Man. check = Yes × Contact UN = Doesn't know/reply			-0.166 (0.406)
Man. check = Yes × Contact UN = Some Contact			-0.235 (0.391)
Man. check = Yes × Contact UN = A lot of contact			-0.183 (0.393)
Constant	0.611*** (0.163)	0.278 (0.675)	0.564** (0.241)
Observations	4,364	4,364	4,364
Control mean	0.67	0.67	0.67
Control SD	0.47	0.47	0.47

Note: The dependent variable is: “Do you or your household consider that there is a risk for being in the reincorporation process?” We created a dummy variable equal to 0 if the respondent answered “no” and equal to 1 if it was answered “yes”. Committed UN is a treatment indicator that takes the value of 1 for respondents assigned to the experimental prime. Blocks correspond to respondents’ trust in the UN: Doesn’t trust (baseline), Trusts, and doesn’t answer question or doesn’t know. We did not consider observations where the respondent answered “Does not know” or “Does not reply”. See the note in Table A.9 for methodological remarks. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

TABLE A.12: Prospective Economic Situation: IV Regressions

VARIABLES	Economic perspectives		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Trusts UN = Doesn't know/reply	0.145 (0.156)	-0.232 (1.611)	0.153 (0.146)
Trusts UN = Yes	0.266*** (0.083)	-0.570 (1.605)	0.262*** (0.084)
Contact UN = Doesn't know/reply			0.006 (0.561)
Contact UN = Some Contact			-0.260 (0.575)
Contact UN = A lot of contact			-0.093 (0.587)
Manipulation check dummy	-0.168 (0.551)	-1.249 (2.684)	-0.280 (0.877)
Man. check = Yes × Block = Doesn't know/reply		0.506 (2.708)	
Man. check = Yes × Block = Trusts		1.341 (2.685)	
Man. check = Yes × Contact UN = Doesn't know/reply			-0.095 (0.888)
Man. check = Yes × Contact UN = Some Contact			0.400 (0.875)
Man. check = Yes × Contact UN = A lot of contact			0.191 (0.881)
Constant	0.029 (0.345)	0.647 (1.552)	0.096 (0.532)
Observations	4,332	4,332	4,332
Control mean	1.72	1.72	1.72
Control SD	0.56	0.56	0.56

Note: The dependent variable is: “When you think about the future, how do you think your financial situation and that of your household will be in the next 12 months?” We classified the answers as follows: equal to 0 if the respondent answered “worse”, equal to 1 if it was answered “the same”, equal to 2 if it was answered “better”. Committed UN is a treatment indicator that takes the value of 1 for respondents assigned to the experimental prime. Blocks correspond to respondents’ trust in the UN: Doesn’t trust (baseline), Trusts, and doesn’t answer question or doesn’t know. We did not consider observations where the respondent answered “Does not know” or “Does not reply”. We then summed all answers and generated a standardized z-score, as described in Section H. See the note in the table A.9 for methodological remarks. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

TABLE A.13: Truth and forgiveness: IV Regressions

VARIABLES	Reconciliation via: truth			Reconciliation via: forgiveness		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Trusts UN = Doesn't know/reply	0.216 (0.154)	0.255 (1.431)	0.189 (0.147)	0.169 (0.145)	0.306 (1.463)	0.161 (0.138)
Trusts UN = Yes	0.409*** (0.081)	0.312 (1.423)	0.379*** (0.085)	0.354*** (0.078)	0.490 (1.454)	0.328*** (0.079)
Contact UN = Doesn't know/reply			0.155 (0.592)			-0.150 (0.589)
Contact UN = Some Contact			-0.017 (0.568)			0.048 (0.532)
Contact UN = A lot of contact			0.169 (0.581)			0.205 (0.540)
Manipulation check dummy	0.057 (0.529)	-0.070 (2.383)	-0.083 (0.870)	0.162 (0.510)	0.335 (2.439)	0.042 (0.815)
Man. check = Yes × Block = Doesn't know/reply		-0.115 (2.397)			-0.241 (2.452)	
Man. check = Yes × Block = Trusts		0.156 (2.385)			-0.218 (2.440)	
Man. check = Yes × Contact UN = Doesn't know/reply			-0.064 (0.885)			0.044 (0.861)
Man. check = Yes × Contact UN = Some Contact			0.179 (0.870)			0.076 (0.815)
Man. check = Yes × Contact UN = A lot of contact			0.077 (0.874)			0.010 (0.816)
Constant	-0.552 (0.344)	-0.479 (1.394)	-0.539 (0.542)	-0.341 (0.325)	-0.439 (1.416)	-0.332 (0.504)
Observations	4,393	4,393	4,393	4,386	4,386	4,386
Control mean	3.94	3.94	3.94	4.04	4.04	4.04
Control SD	1.11	1.11	1.11	1.13	1.13	1.13

Note: The dependent variable is: “How much do you think it would help, to achieve reconciliation?” Columns (1), (2) and (3) suggested “That the truth be established about what happened in the context of the armed conflict”. Columns (4), (5) and (6) suggested “That those responsible for crimes ask forgiveness from the victims”. We classified the answers for both questions as follows: equal to 1 if the respondent answered “not at all”, equal to 2 if it was answered “very little”, equal to 3 if it was answered “somewhat”, equal to 4 if it was answered “a lot”, equal to 5 if it was answered “very much”. Committed UN is a treatment indicator that takes the value of 1 for respondents assigned to the experimental prime. Blocks correspond to respondents’ trust in the UN: Doesn’t trust (baseline), Trusts, and doesn’t answer question or doesn’t know. We did not consider observations where the respondent answered “Does not know” or “Does not reply”. We then summed all answers and generated a standardized z-score, as described in Section H. See the note in the table A.9 for methodological remarks. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

TABLE A.14: Stigma: IV Regressions

VARIABLES	Cautious in reporting FARC membership		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Trusts UN = Doesn't know/reply	0.148 (0.135)	-0.942 (1.557)	0.141 (0.137)
Trusts UN = Yes	0.164* (0.084)	-1.114 (1.554)	0.149* (0.085)
Contact UN = Doesn't know/reply			-0.410 (0.583)
Contact UN = Some Contact			-0.587 (0.568)
Contact UN = A lot of contact			-0.463 (0.581)
Manipulation check dummy	-0.573 (0.554)	-2.148 (2.610)	-0.974 (0.873)
Man. check = Yes × Block = Doesn't know/reply		1.889 (2.611)	
Man. check = Yes × Block = Trusts		2.043 (2.611)	
Man. check = Yes × Contact UN = Doesn't know/reply			0.867 (0.888)
Man. check = Yes × Contact UN = Some Contact			1.007 (0.873)
Man. check = Yes × Contact UN = A lot of contact			0.879 (0.879)
Constant	0.351 (0.344)	1.241 (1.495)	0.552 (0.530)
Observations	4,396	4,396	4,396
Control mean	3.33	3.33	3.33
Control SD	1.05	1.05	1.05

Note: The dependent variable is: “Thinking about the last year, in your daily life, how careful are you about telling others that you were a member of the FARC-EP?” We classified the answers as follows: equal to 1 if the respondent answered “not careful at all”, equal to 2 if it was answered “not very careful”, equal to 3 if it was answered “somewhat careful”, equal to 4 if it was answered “very careful”. Committed UN is a treatment indicator that takes the value of 1 for respondents assigned to the experimental prime. Blocks correspond to respondents’ trust in the UN: Doesn’t trust (baseline), Trusts, and doesn’t answer question or doesn’t know. We did not consider observations where the respondent answered “Does not know” or “Does not reply”. We then summed all answers and generated a standardized z-score, as described in Section H. See the note in the table A.9 for methodological remarks. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

TABLE A.15: Institutional Trust: IV Regressions

VARIABLES	Institutional trust		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Trusts UN = Doesn't know/reply	0.189 (0.156)	0.016 (1.345)	0.174 (0.152)
Trusts UN = Yes	0.558*** (0.077)	0.466 (1.331)	0.555*** (0.079)
Contact UN = Doesn't know/reply			0.164 (0.564)
Contact UN = Some Contact			-0.017 (0.536)
Contact UN = A lot of contact			0.014 (0.548)
Manipulation check dummy	0.127 (0.520)	0.019 (2.243)	0.096 (0.829)
Man. check = Yes × Block = Doesn't know/reply		0.341 (2.265)	
Man. check = Yes × Block = Trusts		0.147 (2.242)	
Man. check = Yes × Contact UN = Doesn't know/reply			-0.024 (0.866)
Man. check = Yes × Contact UN = Some Contact			0.072 (0.827)
Man. check = Yes × Contact UN = A lot of contact			0.013 (0.830)
Constant	-0.319 (0.334)	-0.258 (1.300)	-0.314 (0.512)
Observations	4,435	4,435	4,435
Mean control	0	0	0
SD	1	1	1

Note: The dependent variable is: “How much do you trust: a)The Agency for Reincorporation and Normalization (ARN) b)The mayor’s office of your municipality c)National Government d)Congress e)Colombian Armed Forces (Army, Navy and Air Force) f)National Police”. We generated an Institutional trust index using the answers from trust in all the organizations. First, we classified the answers to each question as follows: equal to 1 if the respondent answered “not at all”, equal to 2 if it was answered “very little”, equal to 3 if it was answered “somewhat”, equal to 4 if it was answered “very much”. Committed UN is a treatment indicator that takes the value of 1 for respondents assigned to the experimental prime. Blocks correspond to respondents’ trust in the UN: Doesn’t trust (baseline), Trusts, and doesn’t answer question or doesn’t know. We did not consider observations where the respondent answered “Does not know” or “Does not reply”. We then summed all answers and generated a standardized z-score, as described in Section H. See the note in the table A.9 for methodological remarks. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

TABLE A.16: Interpersonal Trust: IV Regressions

VARIABLES	Interpersonal trust		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Trusts UN = Doesn't know/reply	0.077 (0.160)	1.094 (1.476)	0.027 (0.148)
Trusts UN = Yes	0.376*** (0.079)	1.524 (1.456)	0.333*** (0.080)
Contact UN = Doesn't know/reply			0.448 (0.589)
Contact UN = Some Contact			0.493 (0.543)
Contact UN = A lot of contact			0.607 (0.552)
Manipulation check dummy	0.613 (0.532)	2.030 (2.452)	0.608 (0.837)
Man. check = Yes × Block = Doesn't know/reply		-1.796 (2.474)	
Man. check = Yes × Block = Trusts		-1.841 (2.452)	
Man. check = Yes × Contact UN = Doesn't know/reply			-0.286 (0.885)
Man. check = Yes × Contact UN = Some Contact			-0.426 (0.836)
Man. check = Yes × Contact UN = A lot of contact			-0.438 (0.838)
Constant	-0.835** (0.340)	-1.643 (1.418)	-0.961* (0.516)
Observations	4,435	4,435	4,435
Mean control	0	0	0
SD	1	1	1

Note: The dependent variable is: “How much do you trust: a)your family b)and your friends c)and your neighbors d)and other people who were part of the FARC-EP e)and strangers”. We generated an Interpersonal trust index using the answers from trust in all the organizations. First, we classified the answers to each question as follows: equal to 1 if the respondent answered “not at all”, equal to 2 if it was answered “very little”, equal to 3 if it was answered “somewhat”, equal to 4 if it was answered “very much”. Committed UN is a treatment indicator that takes the value of 1 for respondents assigned to the experimental prime. Blocks correspond to respondents’ trust in the UN: Doesn’t trust (baseline), Trusts, and doesn’t answer question or doesn’t know. We did not consider observations where the respondent answered “Does not know” or “Does not reply”. We then summed all answers and generated a standardized z-score, as described in Section H. See the note in the table A.9 for methodological remarks. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

TABLE A.17: *How willing is the population in your municipality to reconcile: IV Regressions*

VARIABLES	How willing is the population in your municipality to reconcile		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Trusts UN = Doesn't know/reply	0.593*** (0.162)	1.719 (1.240)	0.551*** (0.150)
Trusts UN = Yes	0.320*** (0.077)	1.445 (1.226)	0.275*** (0.078)
Contact UN = Doesn't know/reply			0.404 (0.533)
Contact UN = Some Contact			0.600 (0.506)
Contact UN = A lot of contact			0.839 (0.517)
Manipulation check dummy	0.636 (0.495)	1.956 (2.056)	0.771 (0.773)
Man. check = Yes × Block = Doesn't know/reply		-2.079 (2.081)	
Man. check = Yes × Block = Trusts		-1.784 (2.056)	
Man. check = Yes × Contact UN = Doesn't know/reply			-0.703 (0.799)
Man. check = Yes × Contact UN = Some Contact			-0.677 (0.773)
Man. check = Yes × Contact UN = A lot of contact			-0.788 (0.777)
Constant	-0.532* (0.313)	-1.269 (1.171)	-0.719 (0.475)
Observations	4,324	4,324	4,324
Control mean	3.06	3.06	3.06
Control SD	0.88	0.88	0.88

Note: The dependent variable is: “In the municipality where you currently reside, how willing is the population to reconcile within the framework of the Peace Agreement?”. We classified the answers as follows: equal to 1 if the respondent answered “not at all”, equal to 2 if it was answered “very little”, equal to 3 if it was answered “somewhat”, equal to 4 if it was answered “very much”. Committed UN is a treatment indicator that takes the value of 1 for respondents assigned to the experimental prime. Blocks correspond to respondents’ trust in the UN: Doesn’t trust (baseline), Trusts, and doesn’t answer question or doesn’t know. We did not consider observations where the respondent answered “Does not know” or “Does not reply”. We then summed all answers and generated a standardized z-score, as described in Section H. See the note in the table A.9 for methodological remarks. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

TABLE A.18: *How willing is the population in Colombia in general to reconcile: IV Regressions*

VARIABLES	How willing is the population in Colombia in general to reconcile		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Trusts UN = Doesn't know/reply	0.660*** (0.167)	2.386 (1.668)	0.613*** (0.162)
Trusts UN = Yes	0.296*** (0.081)	1.917 (1.658)	0.260*** (0.086)
Contact UN = Doesn't know/reply			0.939 (0.612)
Contact UN = Some Contact			0.630 (0.572)
Contact UN = A lot of contact			0.904 (0.584)
Manipulation check dummy	0.774 (0.529)	2.807 (2.785)	1.076 (0.877)
Man. check = Yes × Block = Doesn't know/reply		-3.135 (2.809)	
Man. check = Yes × Block = Trusts		-2.598 (2.785)	
Man. check = Yes × Contact UN = Doesn't know/reply			-0.943 (0.903)
Man. check = Yes × Contact UN = Some Contact			-0.877 (0.875)
Man. check = Yes × Contact UN = A lot of contact			-1.031 (0.881)
Constant	-0.780** (0.333)	-1.934 (1.598)	-1.027* (0.536)
Observations	4,357	4,357	4,357
Control mean	3.04	3.04	3.04
Control SD	0.75	0.75	0.75

Note: The dependent variable is: “In Colombia, in general, how willing is the population to reconcile within the framework of the Peace Agreement?”. We classified the answers as follows: equal to 1 if the respondent answered “not at all”, equal to 2 if it was answered “very little”, equal to 3 if it was answered “somewhat”, equal to 4 if it was answered “very much”. Committed UN is a treatment indicator that takes the value of 1 for respondents assigned to the experimental prime. Blocks correspond to respondents’ trust in the UN: Doesn’t trust (baseline), Trusts, and doesn’t answer question or doesn’t know. We did not consider observations where the respondent answered “Does not know” or “Does not reply”. We then summed all answers and generated a standardized z-score, as described in Section H. See the note in the table A.9 for methodological remarks. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

F Regressions using lasso to select covariates

TABLE A.19: *Regressions using Lasso: variable group 1*

VARIABLES	(1) Follow-through: Govt	(2) Follow-through: FARC	(3) Economic perspectives	(4) Safety risks
Committed UN	0.012 (0.029)	0.032 (0.029)	-0.007 (0.030)	0.010 (0.014)
Trusts UN = Doesn't know/reply	0.393*** (0.132)	0.087 (0.129)	0.220 (0.139)	-0.169*** (0.061)
Trusts UN = Yes	0.394*** (0.034)	0.364*** (0.042)	0.250*** (0.042)	-0.061*** (0.017)
Constant	-0.109*** (0.037)	-0.417*** (0.044)	-0.203*** (0.042)	0.650*** (0.018)
Observations	4,383	4,337	4,332	4,359
Control mean	2.51	3.90	1.72	0.67
Control SD	1.09	1.11	0.56	0.47
Controls	Lasso	Lasso	Lasso	Lasso

Note: The question for the dependent variable in each column is: (1)“How confident are you that the National Government will comply with the Peace Agreement?” (2)“How confident are you that the Signatories of the FARC-EP will comply with the Peace Agreement?” (3)“When you think about the future, how do you think your financial situation and that of your household will be in the next 12 months?” (4)“Do you or your household consider that there is a risk for being in the reincorporation process?” Committed UN is a treatment indicator that takes the value of 1 for respondents assigned to the experimental prime. Blocks correspond to respondents' trust in the UN: Doesn't trust (baseline), Trusts, and doesn't answer question or doesn't know. The potential covariates includes: age, dummy equal to 1 if it is female sex, dummy equal to 1 if it is countryside resident, total killings of social leaders, total killings of signatories, signatories killings tertiles, region of residence, dummy for each type of productive project (individual, collective, no one), dummy equal to 1 if the person lives in a old ETCR, education level, ethnicity, dummy equal to 1 if the person received academic assistance in the last 6 months, state of the last assistance, dummy equal to 1 if the person received job assistance, dummy equal to 1 if the person had relatives who received assistance in 2020, dummy equal to 1 if the person had relatives who received assistance in 2021, dummy equal to 1 if the family received assistance 2021, historic monthly stipend by ARN, and frequency of contact with the UN. Finally, we include fixed effects by stratum block of the sampling procedure. Robust standard errors appear in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

TABLE A.20: Regressions using Lasso: variable group 2

VARIABLES	(1) Cautious in reporting FARC membership	(2) Plan to vote in 2022 presidential election	(3) Institutional trust	(4) Interpersonal trust
Committed UN	-0.038 (0.030)	0.009 (0.007)	0.007 (0.029)	0.037 (0.028)
Trusts UN = Doesn't know/reply	0.242** (0.118)	0.006 (0.033)	0.175 (0.146)	-0.002 (0.139)
Trusts UN = Yes	0.094** (0.039)	0.032*** (0.010)	0.585*** (0.034)	0.403*** (0.036)
Constant	-0.076** (0.038)	0.904*** (0.010)	-0.349*** (0.036)	-0.926*** (0.067)
Observations	4,396	4,218	4,430	4,430
Control mean	3.33	0.94	0	0
Control SD	1.05	0.24	1	1
Controls	Lasso	Lasso	Lasso	Lasso

Note: The question for the dependent variable in each column is: (1)“Thinking about the last year, in your daily life, how careful are you about telling others that you were a member of the FARC-EP?” (2)“In the upcoming 2022 presidential election, do you plan to vote?” (3)“Trust institutional index” (4)“Trust interpersonal index”. Committed UN is a treatment indicator that takes the value of 1 for respondents assigned to the experimental prime. Blocks correspond to respondents’ trust in the UN: Doesn’t trust (baseline), Trusts, and doesn’t answer question or doesn’t know. See the note in the table A.19 for methodological remarks. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

TABLE A.21: Regressions using Lasso: variable group 3

VARIABLES	(1) Gov. committed to protecting reincorporados	(2) Local authorities committed to protecting reincorporados	(3) How willing is the population in your municipality to reconcile	(4) How willing is the population in Colombia in general to reconcile	(5) Reconciliation via: truth	(6) Reconciliation via: forgiveness
Committed UN	0.047 (0.029)	0.068** (0.030)	0.035 (0.029)	0.041 (0.030)	-0.004 (0.030)	0 (0.029)
Trusts UN = Doesn't know/reply	0.327*** (0.116)	0.279** (0.118)	0.497*** (0.139)	0.530*** (0.134)	0.213 (0.143)	0.170 (0.133)
Trusts UN = Yes	0.231*** (0.036)	0.240*** (0.039)	0.368*** (0.039)	0.371*** (0.040)	0.391*** (0.041)	0.346*** (0.042)
Constant	0.022 (0.039)	-0.141*** (0.044)	-0.493*** (0.041)	-0.344*** (0.040)	-0.374*** (0.043)	-0.386*** (0.045)
Observations	4,374	4,323	4,324	4,357	4,393	4,386
Control mean	3.11	3.30	3.06	3.04	3.94	4.04
Control SD	1.21	1.12	0.88	0.75	1.11	1.13
Controls	Lasso	Lasso	Lasso	Lasso	Lasso	Lasso

Note: The question for the dependent variable in each column is: (1)“How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? a)The National Government is committed to the protection of the population in process of reincorporation.” (2)“b)The authorities in your territory are committed to the protection of the population in process of reincorporation.” (3)“In the municipality where you currently reside, how willing is the population to reconcile within the framework of the Peace Agreement?” (4)“In Colombia, in general, how willing is the population to reconcile within the framework of the Peace Agreement?” (5)“How much do you think it would help, to achieve reconciliation, a) That the truth be established about what happened in the context of the armed conflict.” (6) “b)That those responsible for crimes ask forgiveness from the victims”. Committed UN is a treatment indicator that takes the value of 1 for respondents assigned to the experimental prime. Blocks correspond to respondents’ trust in the UN: Doesn’t trust (baseline), Trusts, and doesn’t answer question or doesn’t know. See the note in the table A.19 for methodological remarks. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

TABLE A.22: Regressions using Lasso: variable group 4

VARIABLES	(1) Trust ARN	(2) Trust Mayor	(3) Trust National Govt.	(4) Trust Congress	(5) Trust Colombian Armed Forces	(6) Trust Police
Committed UN	-0.009 (0.029)	-0.016 (0.030)	0.016 (0.030)	0.012 (0.030)	0.025 (0.030)	0 (0.029)
Trusts UN = Doesn't know/reply	0.497*** (0.117)	0.314** (0.128)	0.408*** (0.126)	0.251** (0.124)	0.306** (0.127)	0.277** (0.116)
Trusts UN = Yes	0.489*** (0.041)	0.391*** (0.037)	0.427*** (0.035)	0.380*** (0.035)	0.462*** (0.035)	0.424*** (0.035)
Constant	-0.146*** (0.043)	-0.339*** (0.035)	-0.247*** (0.035)	-0.240*** (0.036)	-0.264*** (0.038)	-0.508*** (0.065)
Observations	4,410	4,360	4,414	4,380	4,397	4,401
Control mean	3.46	2.36	2.18	2.08	2.29	2.12
Control SD	0.76	0.97	0.92	0.90	0.98	0.97
Controls	Lasso	Lasso	Lasso	Lasso	Lasso	Lasso

Note: The question for the dependent variable in each column is: “How much do you trust:” (1)“The Agency for Reincorporation and Normalization (ARN)” (2)“The mayor’s office of your municipality” (3)“National Government” (4)“Congress” (5)“Colombian Armed Forces (Army, Navy and Air Force)” (6) “National Police”. Committed UN is a treatment indicator that takes the value of 1 for respondents assigned to the experimental prime. Blocks correspond to respondents’ trust in the UN: Doesn’t trust (baseline), Trusts, and doesn’t answer question or doesn’t know. See the note in the table A.19 for methodological remarks. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

TABLE A.23: Regressions using Lasso: variable group 5

VARIABLES	(1) Trust your family	(2) Trust your friends	(3) Trust your neighbors	(4) Trust other FARC	(5) Trust strangers
Committed UN	0.013 (0.029)	0.055* (0.030)	0.006 (0.029)	0.030 (0.029)	0.032 (0.030)
Trusts UN = Doesn't know/reply	0.077 (0.141)	0.037 (0.123)	0.378*** (0.126)	0.015 (0.134)	-0.056 (0.099)
Trusts UN = Yes	0.256*** (0.043)	0.318*** (0.036)	0.344*** (0.036)	0.339*** (0.037)	0.073* (0.038)
Constant	-0.389*** (0.069)	-0.727*** (0.068)	-1.016*** (0.068)	-0.685*** (0.073)	-0.287*** (0.070)
Observations	4,415	4,409	4,413	4,386	4,417
Control mean	3.67	2.45	2.44	2.75	1.39
Control SD	0.68	0.91	0.91	0.90	0.68
Controls	Lasso	Lasso	Lasso	Lasso	Lasso

Note: The question for the dependent variable in each column is: “How much do you trust:” (1)“Your family” (2)“And your friends” (3)“And your neighbors” (4)“And other people who were part of the FARC-EP?” (5)“And strangers”. Committed UN is a treatment indicator that takes the value of 1 for respondents assigned to the experimental prime. Blocks correspond to respondents’ trust in the UN: Doesn’t trust (baseline), Trusts, and doesn’t answer question or doesn’t know. See the note in the table A.19 for methodological remarks. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

G Regressions using scales

TABLE A.24: *Confidence in the Government to Implement the Peace Agreement*

VARIABLES	Follow-through: Govt		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Committed UN	0.007 (0.032)	0.102 (0.063)	0.036 (0.049)
Trusts UN = Doesn't know/reply	0.467*** (0.144)	0.492** (0.213)	0.450*** (0.142)
Trusts UN = Yes	0.405*** (0.037)	0.465*** (0.052)	0.425*** (0.038)
Contact UN = Doesn't know/reply			0.522* (0.271)
Contact UN = Some Contact			-0.015 (0.055)
Contact UN = A lot of contact			-0.115** (0.058)
Committed UN × Trusts UN = Doesn't know/reply		-0.053 (0.289)	
Committed UN × Trusts UN = Yes		-0.122* (0.073)	
Committed UN × Contact UN = Doesn't know/reply			-0.641* (0.344)
Committed UN × Contact UN = Some Contact			-0.066 (0.075)
Committed UN × Contact UN = A lot of contact			-0.008 (0.081)
Constant	2.430*** (0.131)	2.382*** (0.133)	2.445*** (0.135)
Observations	4,388	4,388	4,388
Control mean	2.51	2.51	2.51
Control SD	1.09	1.09	1.09

Note: The dependent variable is: "How confident are you that the national government will comply with the Peace Agreement?" Answers were coded as a 5-point Likert scale, from "not at all" to "completely". Committed UN is a treatment indicator that takes the value of 1 for respondents assigned to the experimental prime. Blocks correspond to respondents' trust in the UN: Doesn't trust (baseline), Trusts, and doesn't answer question or doesn't know. Respondents who did not know or did not respond were excluded. In column 2, we estimate heterogeneous treatment effects by blocks measuring pre-treatment trust in the UN Verification Mission. In column 3 we include fixed effects for frequency of contact with the UN, and estimate heterogeneous treatment effects of this contact. This variable is taken from the question: "In the last 12 months, how often have you, a member of your family or a close friend had direct contact with a member of the UN Verification Mission in Colombia?" Those who answered "always" or "almost always" were coded as having "high contact"; those who answered "sometimes" were coded as having "some contact"; those who answered "almost never" or "never" were coded as having "low contact"; and those who didn't know or didn't answer were coded as "don't know or don't answer." The base category is "little contact." All columns include fixed effects for strata used for the sampling procedure. Robust standard errors appear in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

TABLE A.25: Confidence in the FARC-EP to Implement the Peace Agreement

VARIABLES	Follow-through: FARC		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Committed UN	0.044 (0.033)	0.096 (0.084)	0.080 (0.052)
Trusts UN = Doesn't know/reply	0.107 (0.146)	0.042 (0.201)	0.096 (0.148)
Trusts UN = Yes	0.435*** (0.046)	0.469*** (0.066)	0.389*** (0.047)
Contact UN = Doesn't know/reply			0.125 (0.237)
Contact UN = Some Contact			0.152*** (0.057)
Contact UN = A lot of contact			0.270*** (0.057)
Committed UN × Trusts UN = Doesn't know/reply		0.126 (0.289)	
Committed UN × Trusts UN = Yes		-0.070 (0.091)	
Committed UN × Contact UN = Doesn't know/reply			-0.451 (0.375)
Committed UN × Contact UN = Some Contact			-0.075 (0.079)
Committed UN × Contact UN = A lot of contact			-0.064 (0.078)
Constant	3.370*** (0.122)	3.345*** (0.128)	3.274*** (0.124)
Observations	4,337	4,337	4,337
Control mean	3.90	3.90	3.90
Control SD	1.11	1.11	1.11

Note: The dependent variable is: “How confident are you that signatories of the FARC-EP will comply with the peace agreement?” Answers were coded as a 5-point Likert scale, from “not at all” to “completely”. Committed UN is a treatment indicator that takes the value of 1 for respondents assigned to the experimental prime. Blocks correspond to respondents’ trust in the UN: Doesn’t trust (baseline), Trusts, and doesn’t answer question or doesn’t know. Respondents who did not know or did not respond were excluded. Robust standard errors appear in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

TABLE A.26: Prospective Economic Situation

VARIABLES	Economic perspectives		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Committed UN	-0.005 (0.017)	-0.010 (0.043)	0.024 (0.027)
Trusts UN = Doesn't know/reply	0.094 (0.078)	0.076 (0.110)	0.096 (0.079)
Trusts UN = Yes	0.136*** (0.024)	0.134*** (0.034)	0.134*** (0.024)
Contact UN = Doesn't know/reply			0.016 (0.117)
Contact UN = Some Contact			0.041 (0.029)
Contact UN = A lot of contact			0.026 (0.030)
Committed UN × Trusts UN = Doesn't know/reply		0.036 (0.158)	
Committed UN × Trusts UN = Yes		0.005 (0.047)	
Committed UN × Contact UN = Doesn't know/reply			-0.098 (0.190)
Committed UN × Contact UN = Some Contact			-0.073* (0.041)
Committed UN × Contact UN = A lot of contact			-0.030 (0.041)
Constant	1.683*** (0.055)	1.685*** (0.059)	1.665*** (0.057)
Observations	4,332	4,332	4,332
Control mean	1.72	1.72	1.72
Control SD	0.56	0.56	0.56

Note: The dependent variable is: "When you think about the future, what do you think your financial situation and that of your household will be in the next 12 months?" We coded answers as follows: equal to 0 if the respondent answered "worse," equal to 1 if the respondent answered "the same," equal to 2 if the respondent answered "better". Committed UN is a treatment indicator that takes the value of 1 for respondents assigned to the experimental prime. Blocks correspond to respondents' trust in the UN: Doesn't trust (baseline), Trusts, and doesn't answer question or doesn't know. Respondents who did not know or did not respond were excluded. Robust standard errors appear in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

TABLE A.27: *How willing is the population in your municipality to reconcile?*

VARIABLES	How willing is the population in your municipality to reconcile		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Committed UN	0.034 (0.026)	-0.044 (0.060)	0.051 (0.041)
Trusts UN = Doesn't know/reply	0.434*** (0.123)	0.350* (0.186)	0.430*** (0.121)
Trusts UN = Yes	0.353*** (0.034)	0.306*** (0.047)	0.300*** (0.034)
Contact UN = Doesn't know/reply			0.056 (0.219)
Contact UN = Some Contact			0.149*** (0.044)
Contact UN = A lot of contact			0.305*** (0.045)
Committed UN × Trusts UN = Doesn't know/reply		0.170 (0.246)	
Committed UN × Trusts UN = Yes		0.096 (0.067)	
Committed UN × Contact UN = Doesn't know/reply			-0.207 (0.282)
Committed UN × Contact UN = Some Contact			-0.019 (0.061)
Committed UN × Contact UN = A lot of contact			-0.062 (0.062)
Constant	2.909*** (0.095)	2.948*** (0.100)	2.810*** (0.097)
Observations	4,324	4,324	4,324
Control mean	3.06	3.06	3.06
Control SD	0.88	0.88	0.88

Note: The dependent variable is: "In the municipality where you currently reside, how willing is the population to reconcile within the framework of the peace agreement?". We coded the answers using a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from "not at all" to "very much". Committed UN is a treatment indicator that takes the value of 1 for respondents assigned to the experimental prime. Blocks correspond to respondents' trust in the UN: Doesn't trust (baseline), Trusts, and doesn't answer question or doesn't know. Respondents who did not know or did not respond were excluded. Robust standard errors appear in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

TABLE A.28: *How willing is the population in Colombia in general to reconcile?*

VARIABLES	How willing is the population in Colombia in general to reconcile		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Committed UN	0.034 (0.023)	-0.031 (0.054)	0.069** (0.035)
Trusts UN = Doesn't know/reply	0.423*** (0.105)	0.236 (0.155)	0.399*** (0.103)
Trusts UN = Yes	0.298*** (0.030)	0.260*** (0.042)	0.265*** (0.030)
Contact UN = Doesn't know/reply			0.273* (0.141)
Contact UN = Some Contact			0.095** (0.038)
Contact UN = A lot of contact			0.192*** (0.041)
Committed UN × Trusts UN = Doesn't know/reply		0.379* (0.207)	
Committed UN × Trusts UN = Yes		0.076 (0.059)	
Committed UN × Contact UN = Doesn't know/reply			-0.039 (0.243)
Committed UN × Contact UN = Some Contact			-0.092* (0.053)
Committed UN × Contact UN = A lot of contact			-0.044 (0.056)
Constant	2.779*** (0.087)	2.812*** (0.090)	2.708*** (0.089)
Observations	4,357	4,357	4,357
Control mean	3.04	3.04	3.04
Control SD	0.75	0.75	0.75

Note: The dependent variable is: "In Colombia, in general, how willing is the population to reconcile within the framework of the Peace Agreement?". We coded answers using a 4-point Likert scale ranging from "not at all" to "very much". Committed UN is a treatment indicator that takes the value of 1 for respondents assigned to the experimental prime. Blocks correspond to respondents' trust in the UN: Doesn't trust (baseline), Trusts, and doesn't answer question or doesn't know. Respondents who did not know or did not respond were excluded. Robust standard errors appear in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

TABLE A.29: Willingness to self-report having belonged to the FARC-EP

VARIABLES	Cautious in reporting FARC membership		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Committed UN	-0.034 (0.032)	-0.113 (0.075)	-0.092* (0.051)
Trusts UN = Doesn't know/reply	0.229* (0.125)	0.054 (0.178)	0.216* (0.125)
Trusts UN = Yes	0.093** (0.042)	0.047 (0.058)	0.071* (0.043)
Contact UN = Doesn't know/reply			0.093 (0.215)
Contact UN = Some Contact			0.031 (0.056)
Contact UN = A lot of contact			0.050 (0.057)
Committed UN × Trusts UN = Doesn't know/reply		0.355 (0.248)	
Committed UN × Trusts UN = Yes		0.095 (0.083)	
Committed UN × Contact UN = Doesn't know/reply			0.121 (0.313)
Committed UN × Contact UN = Some Contact			0.085 (0.078)
Committed UN × Contact UN = A lot of contact			0.114 (0.078)
Constant	3.362*** (0.109)	3.402*** (0.113)	3.350*** (0.112)
Observations	4,396	4,396	4,396
Control mean	3.33	3.33	3.33
Control SD	1.05	1.05	1.05

Note: The dependent variable is: "Thinking about the last year, in your daily life how careful are you about telling others that you were a member of the FARC-EP?" We coded answers using a 4-point Likert scale ranging from "not careful at all", to "very careful". Committed UN is a treatment indicator that takes the value of 1 for respondents assigned to the experimental prime. Blocks correspond to respondents' trust in the UN: Doesn't trust (baseline), Trusts, and doesn't answer question or doesn't know. Respondents who did not know or did not respond were excluded. Robust standard errors appear in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

TABLE A.30: Truth and forgiveness

VARIABLES	Reconciliation via: truth			Reconciliation via: forgiveness		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Committed UN	0.004 (0.033)	-0.046 (0.083)	-0.022 (0.053)	0.010 (0.033)	-0.019 (0.086)	-0.019 (0.053)
Trusts UN = Doesn't know/reply	0.233 (0.161)	0.238 (0.254)	0.220 (0.158)	0.172 (0.155)	0.185 (0.249)	0.170 (0.152)
Trusts UN = Yes	0.464*** (0.046)	0.432*** (0.063)	0.417*** (0.046)	0.423*** (0.047)	0.404*** (0.067)	0.376*** (0.047)
Contact UN = Doesn't know/reply			0.017 (0.253)			-0.184 (0.303)
Contact UN = Some Contact			0.086 (0.057)			0.118** (0.058)
Contact UN = A lot of contact			0.244*** (0.058)			0.205*** (0.059)
Committed UN × Trusts UN = Doesn't know/reply		-0.009 (0.321)			-0.025 (0.311)	
Committed UN × Trusts UN = Yes		0.063 (0.090)			0.039 (0.093)	
Committed UN × Contact UN = Doesn't know/reply			0.230 (0.366)			0.086 (0.408)
Committed UN × Contact UN = Some Contact			0.060 (0.079)			-0.002 (0.080)
Committed UN × Contact UN = A lot of contact			-0.001 (0.081)			0.084 (0.079)
Constant	3.364*** (0.134)	3.389*** (0.140)	3.294*** (0.137)	3.757*** (0.116)	3.772*** (0.123)	3.695*** (0.120)
Observations	4,393	4,393	4,393	4,386	4,386	4,386
Control mean	3.94	3.94	3.94	4.04	4.04	4.04
Control SD	1.11	1.11	1.11	1.13	1.13	1.13

Note: The dependent variable is: “How much do you think X would help to achieve reconciliation?” where X in columns 1, 2 and 3 is “that the truth be established about what happened in the context of the armed conflict,” and columns 4, 5 and 6 is “that those responsible for crimes ask forgiveness from the victims.” We coded answers for both questions using a 5-point Likert scale ranging from “not at all” to “very much”. Committed UN is a treatment indicator that takes the value of 1 for respondents assigned to the experimental prime. Blocks correspond to respondents’ trust in the UN: Doesn’t trust (baseline), Trusts, and doesn’t answer question or doesn’t know. Respondents who did not know or did not respond were excluded. Robust standard errors appear in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

H Building indices for institutional and interpersonal trust

In this section, we explain how the indices were constructed. The steps are identical for all indices, and follow the example of Kling, Ludwig and Katz (2004).

1. Some outcomes will be reoriented - only if necessary - so that the values given to each response are consistent across all questions. For example, this means that for all the same questions of a trust index higher scores correspond to higher trust.
2. A z-score \tilde{z}_{ik} will be calculated for each question by standardizing the score z_{ik} given each answer and, based on the control group (the mean of the control group is subtracted and divided by the standard deviation of the control group), we calculate:

$$\tilde{z}_{ik} = \frac{z_{ik} - \bar{z}_{ik}^{T=0}}{\sigma_k^{z,T=0}}$$

The control group used corresponds to the family of hypothesis evaluated (that is, the z-scores do not change within families of hypothesis, but will be different across them).

3. Finally, these z-scores are added $\sum_{i=1}^K \tilde{z}_{ik}$ to generate an index.
4. Optionally, the final index is sometimes standardized with the mean and standard deviation of the control group's index.

I Difference in means

TABLE A.31: Difference in means

VARIABLES	Mean		Diff. (T-C)	P-Value
	Treated	Control		
Follow-through: Govt	0.011 (0.103)	0.010 (0.102)	0.000 (0.102)	0.90
Follow-through: FARC	0.025 (0.155)	0.019 (0.138)	0.005 (0.147)	0.23
Safety risks	0.018 (0.131)	0.014 (0.119)	0.003 (0.126)	0.42
Economic perspectives	0.022 (0.147)	0.024 (0.154)	-0.002 (0.151)	0.59
Reconciliation via: truth	0.011 (0.105)	0.008 (0.087)	0.004 (0.097)	0.22
Reconciliation via: forgiveness	0.011 (0.103)	0.011 (0.106)	-0.001 (0.105)	0.87
How willing is the population in your municipality to reconcile	0.025 (0.157)	0.025 (0.156)	0.000 (0.156)	0.95
How willing is the population in Colombia in general to reconcile	0.019 (0.136)	0.016 (0.127)	0.003 (0.131)	0.51
Cautious in reporting FARC membership	0.007 (0.085)	0.010 (0.102)	-0.003 (0.093)	0.25

Note: Standard deviations in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

J Survey instrument

SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

ENTRY								
Blocking Questions								
1	According to your perception, how much of the Colombian population sees reconciliation with the signatories of the Accord as possible? <i>☛ Enumerator read options.</i>	None	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	Less than half	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	Half of Colombians	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	
		More than half	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	All	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	Does not know	88 <input type="checkbox"/>	
		Does not reply	98 <input type="checkbox"/>					
2	How much do you trust the UN Verification Mission? <i>☛ Enumerator: If the respondent asks what it is, tell him/her that it is the United Nations Verification Mission.</i> <i>☛ Enumerator read options.</i>	A lot	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	Somewhat	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	Very little	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	
		Not at all	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	Does not know	88 <input type="checkbox"/>	Does not reply	98 <input type="checkbox"/>	
2.1.	In the last 12 months, how often have you, a member of your family or a close friend had direct contact with a member of the UN Verification Mission in Colombia? <i>☛ Enumerator read options.</i>	Always	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	Almost always	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	Sometimes	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	
		Almost never	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	never	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	Does not know	88 <input type="checkbox"/>	
		Does not reply	98 <input type="checkbox"/>					
Modules								
3	I am going to read you a list of groups and organizations. Please tell me if, since you began your reincorporation process, you attend meetings of these organizations: at least once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never. [Repeat "once a week," "once or twice a month," "once or twice a year," or "never" to assist the respondent].	Once a week	Once or twice a month	Once or twice a year	Never	Does not know	Does not reply	
	a. Community action boards	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	88 <input type="checkbox"/>	98 <input type="checkbox"/>	
	b. Territorial reincorporation councils	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	88 <input type="checkbox"/>	98 <input type="checkbox"/>	
	c. Departmental peace committees or councils	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	88 <input type="checkbox"/>	98 <input type="checkbox"/>	
4	How important have ARN reincorporation facilitators been in supporting your reincorporation process? <i>☛ Enumerator read options.</i>						Not at all	1 <input type="checkbox"/>
							Very little	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
							Somewhat	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
							A lot	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
							Completely	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
							Does not know	88 <input type="checkbox"/>
							Does not reply	98 <input type="checkbox"/>
5	[Randomize: show only to 50% of the sample]						Yes	1 <input type="checkbox"/>

	Did you know that, according to a recent public opinion poll, more than half of Colombians see "reconciliation with the signatories of the Agreement" as possible?	No	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
5.1	<p><i>☞ Enumerator: If the respondent asks for the source of the information, he/she will be told that it comes from the Barometer of the Americas report, a public opinion survey conducted by the Universidad de los Andes.</i></p> <p><i>Note whether the respondent asked for the source.</i></p>	Yes	1 <input type="checkbox"/>
		No	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
6	<p>[Randomize: show only to 25% of the sample].</p> <p>Did you know that, according to a recent public opinion poll, more than half of Colombians approve of divorce?</p>	Yes	1 <input type="checkbox"/>
		No	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
6.1	<p><i>☞ Enumerator: If the respondent asks for the source of the information, he/she will be told that it comes from the Barometer of the Americas report, a public opinion survey conducted by the Universidad de los Andes.</i></p> <p><i>Note whether the respondent asked for the source.</i></p>	Yes	1 <input type="checkbox"/>
		No	2 <input type="checkbox"/>

Changing the subject, next we will talk about how you perceive the situation in the country.								
7	In the past 2019 local elections, did you vote?	Yes						1 <input type="checkbox"/>
		No						2 <input type="checkbox"/>
		Does not know						88 <input type="checkbox"/>
		Does not reply						98 <input type="checkbox"/>
8	In the upcoming 2022 presidential election, do you plan to vote?	Yes						1 <input type="checkbox"/>
		No						2 <input type="checkbox"/>
		Does not know						88 <input type="checkbox"/>
		Does not reply						98 <input type="checkbox"/>
9	<p>According to the meaning that the term "democracy" has for you, on a scale of 1 to 4, being 1 very dissatisfied and 4 very satisfied, how satisfied do you feel with the way democracy works in Colombia?</p> <p><i>☞ Enumerator read options.</i></p> <p><i>If the respondent states that he/she does not know what democracy is, mark the answer as "Don't know".</i></p>	Very dissatisfied						1 <input type="checkbox"/>
		Dissatisfied						2 <input type="checkbox"/>
		Satisfied						3 <input type="checkbox"/>
		Very satisfied						4 <input type="checkbox"/>
		Does not know						88 <input type="checkbox"/>
		Does not reply						98 <input type="checkbox"/>
10	<p>How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?</p> <p><i>☞ Enumerator read options.</i></p> <p>a. The Colombian State provides Colombians with equal opportunities to overcome poverty.</p> <p>b. If one makes an effort, one can improve one's situation in life.</p>	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree	Does not know	Does not reply
		1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	88 <input type="checkbox"/>	98 <input type="checkbox"/>
		1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	88 <input type="checkbox"/>	98 <input type="checkbox"/>
11	Considering the situation of the country and your current situation, what do you expect your quality of life to be like in 10 years?	Much worse					1 <input type="checkbox"/>	
		Slightly worse					2 <input type="checkbox"/>	
		The same					3 <input type="checkbox"/>	

	☛ Enumerator read options.	Slightly better	4	<input type="checkbox"/>	→ 13				
		Much better	5	<input type="checkbox"/>	→ 13				
		Does not know	88	<input type="checkbox"/>	→ 13				
		Does not reply	98	<input type="checkbox"/>	→ 13				
12	What do you consider to be the main obstacles or difficulties you must face in order to achieve your future economic goals? ☛ Enumerator: Wait for response and probe, "any others?"	Difficulty in accessing basic services	a	<input type="checkbox"/>					
		Difficulty in accessing formal education	b	<input type="checkbox"/>					
		Limited supply of educational programs adapted to their needs	c	<input type="checkbox"/>					
		Difficulty in accessing credit	d	<input type="checkbox"/>					
		Difficulty in accessing the labor market	e	<input type="checkbox"/>					
		Poor working conditions	f	<input type="checkbox"/>					
		Very low wages or labor remuneration	g	<input type="checkbox"/>					
		Low government spending on social programs	h	<input type="checkbox"/>					
		Difficulty in accessing social protection (such as pensions)	i	<input type="checkbox"/>					
		Low government investment in rural development and territorial integration	j	<input type="checkbox"/>					
		Stigmatization in educational environments	k	<input type="checkbox"/>					
		Stigmatization in work environments	l	<input type="checkbox"/>					
		Lack of financial education	m	<input type="checkbox"/>					
Physical security problems	n	<input type="checkbox"/>							
Other, which one? _____	o	<input type="checkbox"/>							
13	[Randomize: show only to 50% of the sample]. The mandate of the Peace Agreement Verification Mission has been extended and the United Nations has expressed its commitment to the reincorporation process. Did you know this?	Yes	1	<input type="checkbox"/>					
		No	2	<input type="checkbox"/>					
14	How satisfied are you with the National Government's management of the implementation of the Peace Agreement? ☛ Encuestador: Read the options	Not at all satisfied	1	<input type="checkbox"/>					
		Very dissatisfied	2	<input type="checkbox"/>					
		Somewhat satisfied	3	<input type="checkbox"/>					
		Very satisfied	4	<input type="checkbox"/>					
		Completely satisfied	5	<input type="checkbox"/>					
		Does not know	88	<input type="checkbox"/>					
		Does not reply	98	<input type="checkbox"/>					
15	How confident are you that [read 15a and 15b separately] will comply with the Peace Agreement?	Not at all	Very little	Somewhat	A lot	Completely	Does not know	Does not reply	
	☛ Enumerator read options.								
	a. The National Government.	1	2	3	4	5	88	98	
	b. Signatories of the FARC-EP.	1	2	3	4	5	88	98	

INSTITUTIONALITY								
16	How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? ☛ Enumerator read options.	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree	Does not know	Does not reply

	a. The National Government is committed to the protection of the population in process of reincorporation.	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	88 <input type="checkbox"/>	98 <input type="checkbox"/>
	b. The authorities in your territory are committed to the protection of the population in process of reincorporation.	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	88 <input type="checkbox"/>	98 <input type="checkbox"/>
	How much do you think [read 17a, 17b, and 17c separately]? <i>☛ Enumerator read options.</i>	Not at all	Very little	Somewhat	A lot	Very much	Does not know	Does not reply
17	a. The Government improves rural security and works to dismantle illegal armed groups?	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	88 <input type="checkbox"/>	98 <input type="checkbox"/>
	b. The Government fights unemployment?	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	88 <input type="checkbox"/>	98 <input type="checkbox"/>
	c. The government combats poverty?	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	88 <input type="checkbox"/>	98 <input type="checkbox"/>
18	Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?	Most people can be trusted.					1 <input type="checkbox"/>	
		You need to be very careful in dealing with other people.					2 <input type="checkbox"/>	
RECONCILIATION AND SELF-IMAGE								
	<i>☛ Enumerator read options.</i>	Not at all	Very little	Somewhat	Very much	Does not know	Does not reply	
20	a. In the municipality where you currently reside, how willing is the population to reconcile within the framework of the Peace Agreement?	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	88 <input type="checkbox"/>	98 <input type="checkbox"/>	
	b. In Colombia, in general, how willing is the population to reconcile within the framework of the Peace Agreement?	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	88 <input type="checkbox"/>	98 <input type="checkbox"/>	
21	Thinking about the last year, in your daily life, how careful are you about telling others that you were a member of the FARC-EP? <i>☛ Enumerator read options.</i>	Not careful at all					1 <input type="checkbox"/>	
		Not very careful					2 <input type="checkbox"/>	
		Somewhat careful					3 <input type="checkbox"/>	
		Very careful					4 <input type="checkbox"/>	
		Does not know					88 <input type="checkbox"/>	
Does not reply					98 <input type="checkbox"/>			
	How much do you think it would help, to achieve reconciliation, [read 22a and 22b separately]?	Not at all	Very little	Somewhat	A lot	Very much	Does not know	Does not reply
22	a. That the truth be established about what happened in the context of the armed conflict.	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	88 <input type="checkbox"/>	98 <input type="checkbox"/>
	b. That those responsible for crimes ask forgiveness from the victims.	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	88 <input type="checkbox"/>	98 <input type="checkbox"/>

We are coming to the end of our survey, we have only a few questions left.

CHARACTERIZATION OF COVID-19:

Next we will talk about COVID-19 and its effects on your life.			
23	Have you or anyone in your household been diagnosed with COVID-19?	Yes	1 <input type="checkbox"/>
		No	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
		Does not know	88 <input type="checkbox"/>
		Does not reply	99 <input type="checkbox"/>
24	On a scale of 1 to 5, 1 being not at all and 5 being very much, and talking about the last seven days, how worried have you been about the state of your health?	Not at all	1 <input type="checkbox"/>
		Very little	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
		Somewhat	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
		A lot	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
		Very much	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
		Does not know	88 <input type="checkbox"/>
		Does not reply	98 <input type="checkbox"/>
25	What is your personal situation regarding the COVID-19 vaccine? <i>☛Enumerator: read the options</i> <i>If the respondent asks, explain that being fully vaccinated is:</i> <i>- If vaccinated with Pfizer, Moderna, Sinovac or Astrazeneca: 2 or 3 shots.</i> <i>- If vaccinated with Janssen: 1 shot.</i>	Already fully vaccinated (2 or 3 doses)	1 <input type="checkbox"/> → 28
		Already received the first shot	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
		Not yet vaccinated but plan to get vaccinated	3 <input type="checkbox"/> → 28
		Not going to get vaccinated	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
		Not sure whether or not to get vaccinated	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
		Does not know	88 <input type="checkbox"/>
		Does not reply	98 <input type="checkbox"/>
26	For what reasons would you not get or hesitate to get the vaccine? <i>☛Enumerator: Wait for response and probe, "any others?"</i>	Vaccine side effects.	a <input type="checkbox"/>
		Fear of becoming infected with coronavirus from the vaccine.	b <input type="checkbox"/>
		Fear of becoming seriously ill with coronavirus.	c <input type="checkbox"/>
		Vaccines don't work/ don't believe in their effectiveness.	d <input type="checkbox"/>
		Coronavirus outbreak is not as serious as people say it is.	e <input type="checkbox"/>
		Don't like needles.	f <input type="checkbox"/>
		Allergic to vaccines.	g <input type="checkbox"/>
		Doesn't have time to get vaccinated.	h <input type="checkbox"/>
		Believes there is a conspiracy theory with vaccines.	i <input type="checkbox"/>
		Already immune / had COVID-19 (thinks he doesn't need the vaccine).	j <input type="checkbox"/>
		Has no symptoms (doesn't understand that the vaccine is preventative and not a cure).	k <input type="checkbox"/>
		Worried that a vaccine is going through clinical trials too quickly.	l <input type="checkbox"/>
		Has not received enough information about the side effects and effectiveness of the vaccines.	m <input type="checkbox"/>
		Mistrust of the entities administering the vaccine.	n <input type="checkbox"/>
		Has heard of cases of people who have died from getting vaccinated.	o <input type="checkbox"/>
		For belief in and use of traditional medicine (indigenous medicine).	p <input type="checkbox"/>
		Because their religion forbids it.	q <input type="checkbox"/>
		They do not get it because they have or had recently: COVID, flu or other illness.	r <input type="checkbox"/>
		Other, which one? _____	s <input type="checkbox"/>
Does not know	88 <input type="checkbox"/>		
Does not reply	98 <input type="checkbox"/>		

27	Prior to the start of the pandemic quarantine, on average how many meals were consumed in your household per day?	Less than 1 meal	1 <input type="checkbox"/>
		1 meal	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
		2 meals	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
		3 meals or more	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
		Does not know	88 <input type="checkbox"/>
		Does not reply	98 <input type="checkbox"/>
28	During the last 7 days, on average how many meals were consumed in your household per day?	Less than 1 meal	1 <input type="checkbox"/>
		1 meal	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
		2 meals	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
		3 meals or more	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
		Does not know	88 <input type="checkbox"/>
		Does not reply	98 <input type="checkbox"/>

TRUST

How much do you trust _____ [read 29a-f separately]?		Not at all	Very little	Somewhat	Very much	Does not know	Does not reply
<i>☛ Enumerator read options.</i>							
29	a. The Agency for Reincorporation and Normalization (ARN)	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	88 <input type="checkbox"/>	98 <input type="checkbox"/>
	b. The mayor's office of your municipality	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	88 <input type="checkbox"/>	98 <input type="checkbox"/>
	c. National Government	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	88 <input type="checkbox"/>	98 <input type="checkbox"/>
	d. Congress	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	88 <input type="checkbox"/>	98 <input type="checkbox"/>
	e. Colombian Armed Forces (Army, Navy and Air Force)	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	88 <input type="checkbox"/>	98 <input type="checkbox"/>
	f. National Police	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	88 <input type="checkbox"/>	98 <input type="checkbox"/>
How much do you trust ...?		Not at all	Very little	Somewhat	Very much	Does not know	Does not reply
<i>☛ Enumerator read options.</i>							
30	a. Your family?	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	88 <input type="checkbox"/>	98 <input type="checkbox"/>
	b. And your friends?	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	88 <input type="checkbox"/>	98 <input type="checkbox"/>
	c. And your neighbors?	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	88 <input type="checkbox"/>	98 <input type="checkbox"/>
	d. And other people who were part of the FARC-EP?	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	88 <input type="checkbox"/>	98 <input type="checkbox"/>
	e. And strangers?	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	88 <input type="checkbox"/>	98 <input type="checkbox"/>

REINCORPORATION PROSPECTS

Economic Prospects

31	Thinking about your current financial situation, do you consider that you are better off, the same or worse off than you were twelve months ago?	Better	1 <input type="checkbox"/>
		The same	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
		Worse	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
		Does not know	88 <input type="checkbox"/>
		Does not reply	98 <input type="checkbox"/>
		32	When you think about the future, how do you think your financial situation and that of your household will be in the next 12 months?
The same	2 <input type="checkbox"/>		
Worse	3 <input type="checkbox"/>		
Does not know	88 <input type="checkbox"/>		
Does not reply	98 <input type="checkbox"/>		

Safety Prospects							
33	Have you or your household experienced security problems during your reincorporation process? <i>☛ Enumerator read options.</i>	Yes			1 <input type="checkbox"/>		
		No			2 <input type="checkbox"/>		
		Does not know			88 <input type="checkbox"/>		
		Does not reply			98 <input type="checkbox"/>		
34	Do you or your household consider that there is a risk for being in the reincorporation process? <i>☛ Enumerator read options.</i>	Yes			1 <input type="checkbox"/>		
		No			2 <input type="checkbox"/>		
		Does not know			88 <input type="checkbox"/>		
		Does not reply			98 <input type="checkbox"/>		
OPTIMISM							
	Speaking of the last twelve months, how often have you felt...	Never	Almost never	Sometimes	Almost always	Always	
	<i>☛ Enumerator read options.</i>						
35	a. Relaxed?	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	
	b. Angry?	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	
	c. Nervous?	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	
	d. Motivated?	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	
	e. Anxious?	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	
36	Currently, the National Council for Reincorporation develops and coordinates community activities. Would you like to receive more information on how you can volunteer in one of these programs? <i>☛ Enumerator: wait for response. If the respondent asks for more information to provide an answer, mark that as the answer choice and proceed to the next question.</i>	Yes				1 <input type="checkbox"/>	
		No				2 <input type="checkbox"/> → 37	
		Inquires more					
		Does not know					88 <input type="checkbox"/> → 37
37	In order to send you this information and invite you to participate in these programs, we need to contact you again. Do you agree to be recontacted for this purpose? <i>☛ Enumerator: if the respondent insists on getting more information, say that you do not have this information and repeat the question.</i>	Yes				1 <input type="checkbox"/>	
		No				2 <input type="checkbox"/>	
		Does not know					88 <input type="checkbox"/>
		Does not reply					98 <input type="checkbox"/>
38	We would also like to contact you again in the future to participate in a follow-up survey about your reincorporation process. If you agree, we will retain your contact information along with your survey data and may contact you again in the coming months. Remember that we will not share your contact information with anyone other than members and researchers of the Universidad de los Andes team. You may also decline to participate.						
		Would you be willing to be contacted again for a follow-up survey?					Yes 1 <input type="checkbox"/> No 2 <input type="checkbox"/>
39	Do you know if the mandate of the UN Verification Mission has been extended?					Yes, it has been extended 1 <input type="checkbox"/> No, it has not been extended 2 <input type="checkbox"/>	
40	What is your current municipality of residence?					Nombre: _____ Does not know 88 <input type="checkbox"/> Does not reply 98 <input type="checkbox"/>	
41	Do you live in an urban or rural area?					Urban area 1 <input type="checkbox"/> → END Rural area (CP or vereda) 2 <input type="checkbox"/>	

42	What is the name of the vereda or centro poblado where you live?	Name: _____	
		Does not know	88 <input type="checkbox"/>
		Does not reply	98 <input type="checkbox"/>
<p>END Thank you very much for your participation. I would like to remind you to follow the general health recommendations such as: keep a distance of two meters, wash your hands constantly and wear a mask in public places. In case you do not have a complete vaccination schedule, we suggest you to go to the nearest health or vaccination center.</p>			
<p>Have a nice day!</p>			